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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND CONTINGENCY
FEE CONTROLS:
IS THE PRESCRIPTION CURING THE
CRISIS OR KILLING THE
PATIENT?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1975, the California Legislature enacted a statute limiting the
contingency fees that attorneys could charge medical malpractice victims
in tort actions brought against health care providers.' The statute was
one of a number of legislative alterations in medical malpractice litiga-
tion2 prompted by a perceived "crisis" affecting the health care delivery
system in the state.3 Meeting in special session, the legislature passed the
1. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1985). The statute provides that:
(a) An attorney shall not contract for or collect a contingency fee for representing
any person seeking damages in connection with an action for injury or damage
against a health care provider based upon such person's alleged professional negli-
gence in excess of the following limits:
(1) Forty percent of the first fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) recovered.
(2) Thirty-three and one-third percent of the next fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)
recovered.
(3) Twenty-five percent of the next one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000)
recovered.
(4) Ten percent of any amount on which the recovery exceeds two hundred thou-
sand dollars ($200,000).
Id.
2. In addition to the contingency fee llmits, the Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act of 1975, Cal. A.B. lxx, 1975-76 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 1, 2 Cal. Stat. 3949 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as MICRA], also imposed comprehensive changes in the health care field in three general
areas: medical quality assurance, medical malpractice insurance and medical malpractice liti-
gation. The major provisions governing medical malpractice litigation include: (1) elimination
of the collateral source rule, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1985); (2) limitation on
recovery for non-economic losses to a maximum of $250,000, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b)
(West Supp. 1985); (3) changes in the statute of limitations for actions for professional negli-
gence against health care providers, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982); (4) require-
ment of notice to health care providers of intention to file suit, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 364
(West 1982); (5) requirement that awards for future damages in excess of $50,000 must, on
request by the defendant, be paid periodically rather than made in a lump sum payment, CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1980); and (6) provisions governing arbitration clauses in
contracts for medical services, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(a) (West 1982).
3. The situation was termed a "crisis" in California in a report by the state's Auditor
General which concluded that: (1) few insurance companies were providing medical malprac-
tice insurance in California; (2) the insurance industry was facing a net loss of approximately
$400,000,000 for coverage provided during the period 1960 through 1974; (3) premiums paid
by doctors in California in 1976 were projected to increase about five times from the amount
paid in 1974; and (4) premiums paid by California doctors had not kept pace with increasing
claim costs over the previous 15 years. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COMMITTEE, OFFICE OF
624 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:623
controversial reform measures amidst heated debate among doctors, law-
yers and insurance companies.4
Carrying the bitter debate to the courts, opponents immediately
launched constitutional challenges to every major provision embodied in
the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA). Their ten year
legal battle ended when the California Supreme Court narrowly upheld
each of the Act's provisions in a series of four cases.5 The decisions re-
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE: THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN-
SURANCE CRISIS IN CALIFORNIA 1, 4-5 (1975) [hereinafter cited as AUDITOR GENERAL'S RE-
PORT].
In 1965 there were at least 17 companies writing malpractice insurance in California. In
December of 1975 there were only three, with one carrier "making every effort to withdraw
from the medical malpractice market." Id. at 13. In January of 1975, Pacific Indemnity and
Star Insurance Companies notified the 2000 doctors they insured in southern California that
their coverage would not be renewed. Meanwhile, Argonaut Insurance, which provided insur-
ance to 4000 doctors in northern California, increased its premiums by 380%. Keene, Califor-
nia's Medical Malpractice Crisis, in A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ISSUE 27 (1976). At the same time, a work slowdown was proposed by Los Angeles County
doctors following a proposed insurance rate hike of 486%. When Doctors Rebel Against
Higher Insurance Costs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 19, 1976, at 36.
The problem had also become one of national concern. By October of 1975 at least 39
states had commissioned studies of the medical malpractice crisis and 22 states had revised
civil practice laws to remedy the problem. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Mal-
practice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx. L. REv. 759, 761 n.14 (1977).
See also, T. LOMBARDI, JR., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A LEGISLATOR'S VIEW
118-19 (1978) (chart of state reforms); Chapman & White, Are the New State Malpractice Laws
Working to Protect You?, 8 LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE, May, 1980, at 40, 42-46.
4. See generally Keene, supra note 3, at 27. Keene, a California state senator, was the
principal author of the California legislation. In his article, Senator Keene described the battle
waged before the legislature by these various interests. Id. at 31-33.
5. The four decisions beginning in July of 1984 include: (1) American Bank & Trust Co.
v. Community Hospital, 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984) (upholding
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 1980), governing periodic payments of future damage
awards); (2) Barme v. Wood, 37 Cal. 3d 174, 689 P.2d 446, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1984) (uphold-
ing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1985), prohibiting recovery of benefits by collateral
sources from medical malpractice defendants); (3) Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc., 37 Cal.
3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77, modified, 38 Cal. 3d 620a (1985) (upholding CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1985), establishing contingency fee limitations in
actions against health care providers); and (4) Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d
137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985) (upholding CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West
Supp. 1985), permitting introduction of evidence of benefits received by plaintiffs from collat-
eral sources and CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1985) limiting plaintiffs' recovery of
damages for non-economic losses in medical malpractice actions to $250,000).
Three of the four cases were decided by 4-3 votes. Justice Otto Kaus wrote the majority
opinion in each case and was joined by Justice Broussard and Grodin in all four. Justice
Reynoso joined the majority in the Barme case, which was decided by a 5-2 vote. Newly
appointed Justice Malcolm Lucas joined the majority in the last three cases, Roa, Barme and
Fein. Chief Justice Bird and Justice Mosk dissented in all four cases and were joined by a
judicial council appointee in all but the Barme case.
The court had initially indicated its intention to strike down MICRA. In March of 1983,
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fiect a conservative shift by a majority of the court away from its histori-
cally active role in creating or upholding individual rights and set a new
benchmark for the scope of judicial review in California.
In addition, one issue of special significance emerged for the first
time from the court's review of the Act's contingency fee limits in Roa v.
Lodi Medical Group, Inc.6 In a lengthy dissent, Chief Justice Bird con-
tended that a limit on attorney fees infringes litigants' free speech rights
and, consequently, violates the first amendment. Her view raises new
questions about the validity of such controls and the limits of legislative
power to regulate attorney fees.
This Note will explore the implications of the Roa case: both the
majority's standard for judicial review in California, and the dissent's
signal for expanded recognition of individual first amendment freedoms.
Additionally, this Note will consider the application of statutory contin-
gency fee limits to all tort actions, and whether the Roa decision supports
such an extension.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 6146
The medical malpractice insurance crisis erupted in the early 1970's
when insurance premiums rose dramatically and insurance companies,
apparently faced with huge losses, withdrew from the medical malprac-
tice field into more profitable lines of business.7 This prompted legisla-
tive scrutiny on a national and local level, as well as debates in the
insurance, medical and legal professions concerning the cause and cure
for this crisis. In 1974, a California Assembly Select Committee began
investigating the roots of the problem and sought recommendations for
measures to bring insurance premiums back in line.'
the court reached its first of two decisions in the American Bank case, holding by a 4-3 vote
that the periodic payment provision was invalid. 33 Cal. 3d 674, 660 P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr.
371 (1983), rev'd, 36 Cal. 3d 359, 633 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984) (original opinion
ordered depublished). The majority opinion, written by Justice Mosk, concluded that the act
had failed to meet its purpose of holding down medical costs and that, therefore, the provision
was an unconstitutional denial of equal protection because it was based on false legislative
assumptions. 660 P.2d at 840-41, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83. Following the rehearing, the court
reversed its decision. 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984).
6. 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77, modified, 38 Cal. 3d 620a (1985),
appeal dismissed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3344 (Nov. 18, 1985). At the time of publication of this article,
the modification of the Roa opinion appears in a separate volume of the California Reports
Advance Sheets. When the bound edition of Volume 37 is published, the modification will be
inserted directly in the text and will not appear separately. Pages appearing after the inserted
text will be adjusted accordingly. As a result, the page references in this Note may be slightly
affected.
7. See supra note 3.
8. The California Assembly Select Committee on Medical Malpractice held its first hear-
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Concerns about contingency fees and their effect on insurance pre-
miums were raised during these legislative hearings.9 While contingency
fees are recognized as a means for the poor to gain access to the courts,
10
some witnesses suggested that they indirectly lead to higher premiums
because they are a factor in high jury verdicts and encourage attorneys to
initiate unjustified litigation. 1 Thus, contingency fee linpitations were
ing in Los Angeles on November 12, 1973. Further hearings were conducted on December 20,
1973, November 8, 1974 and February 8, 18 and 21, 1975. See, eg., California Assembly Select
Committee Hearing on Medical Malpractice, Nov. 12, 1973, 1973-74 Reg. Sess. (1973); Califor-
nia Assembly Select Committee Hearing on Medical Malpractice, Feb. 8, 1975, 1975-76 Reg.
Sess. (1975) [hereinafter these hearings will be cited collectively as Select Committee Hearings
along with the appropriate hearing date]. The Committee made factual findings concerning
the increase in malpractice claims (40% rise in nine years), increases in insurance rates (400%
between 1968-70) and the reasons for those increases. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY SELECT COM-
MITTEE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PRELIMINARY REPORT 3-6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
SELECT COMMITTEE PRELIMINARY REPORT]. It concluded that "[t]he principal reason for
the increase of medical malpractice claims is that more patients are electing to sue today than
ever before," and that this "'legal rights explosion'" resulted from the fact that "[a] greater
number of plaintiff's lawyers have become experts in medical malpractice." Id. at 3-4. The
committee found, however, that "there is little evidence that a large number of non-meritori-
ous medical malpractice nuisance suits have been filed." Id. at 5.
A study commissioned by the California Legislature concluded that the crisis resulted
from the restricted availability of malpractice insurance, the lack of policing of physicians by
the state's Board of Medical Examiners, the failure of the Department of Insurance to police
the insurance industry and to assure that malpractice insurance rates and reserves were ade-
quate and the unregulated investment practices of the insurance industry which had resulted in
a severe strain on the industry's financial solvency. AUDITOR GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note
3, at 2-4.
9. See Select Committee Hearings (Nov. 8, 1974), supra note 8, at 12-13; Select Commit-
tee Hearings (Feb. 18, 1975), supra note 8, at 17, 84-98, 102-05; Select Committee Hearings
(Feb. 21, 1975), supra note 8, at 80-82, 101, 154-56.
10. One commentator has stated that "[tihe contingent fee makes it possible for anyone in
our society to get the best lawyer. The client need not be a rich man. He need only have a
good case." Kreindler, The Contingent Fee: Whose Interests Are Actually Being Served?, 14
FORUM 406 (1979). The contingent fee encourages efficiency and has led to the development
of the lawyer as an agent for desirable social change, with an incentive to make the law better
and recovery more adequate. Id. See also F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL
SERVICES 5 (1964).
11. See Select Committee Hearings (Feb. 18, 1975), supra note 8, at 145-46 (testimony of
Assemblyman Leroy Greene); Select Committee Hearings (Feb. 21, 1975), supra note 8, at 75-
76, 81 (testimony of Kay Eberhard, Vice President of Signal Imperial Insurance Co.); Id. at
101 (testimony of Dr. Sanford Rothenberg, President, Los Angeles County Medical Associa-
tion).
In general, contingency fees have been said to create a conflict of interest between the
attorney and client, encourage solicitation and nuisance suits, prevent settlements and lead to
increased litigation costs and unreasonable attorney fees. See F. MACKINNON, supra note 10,
at 4-5; Comment, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection
Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 829, 942 (1979); Comment, Physicians Counterattack, 45 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 1003, 1082 (1977); Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKn L.J. 1417, 1443.
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proposed by various legislative and administrative committees as one
means of guaranteeing the availability of medical malpractice
insurance. 12
Critics of the proposed fee limits claimed that lower contingency
fees would have little, if any effect on insurance premiums, 3 and would
serve only to discourage attorneys from handling even meritorious medi-
cal malpractice cases. 14 Lower. insurance rates, they contended, would
result from such controls only because meritorious plaintiffs would be
unfairly denied the ability to sue.'5 Further, several reports pointed out
that contingency fees actually protect physicians from groundless suits
since attorneys screen out unpromising cases.'
6
12. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE: REPORT OF THE SECRE-
TARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE XX (1973) (summary of recommendations)
[hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT]; SELECT COMMITTEE PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note
8, at 69.
13. The Auditor General's Report concluded that "[u]nless the amount of medical mal-
practice settlements continue to increase in the future there will be little if any effect on medical
malpractice rates as a result of limitations imposed on attorney contingency fees." AUDITOR
GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 30 (emphasis added). The California Insurance Com-
missioner projected the premium savings from lower contingency fees in medical malpractice
cases at one to three percent, while savings from the overall MICRA package of reforms were
estimated at anywhere from 17% to 33%. AB lxx Premium Savings Estimated by the Insur-
ance Commissioner (Aug. 5, 1975), reprinted in Sulnick, Medical Malpractice Reform Act
(1975): The Failure of AB lxx to Deal with Medical Malpractice-A Constitutional Tragedy, 15
CAL. TRIAL LAW J. 17, 59-60 n.104 (1976). Jurors, in fact, may not legally consider attorney
fees in reaching a verdict and to do so may be grounds for a mistrial. See Krouse v. Graham,
19 Cal. 3d 59, 81, 562 P.2d 1022, 1034, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 875 (1977).
14. See Select Committee Hearings (Feb. 18, 1975), supra note 8, at 85-87 (testimony of
Arne Werchick, representing Cal. Trial Lawyers Ass'n); Comment, supra note 11, 52 S. CAL.
L. REv. at 944. One commentatorhas stated:
Since many of these legislative changes limit the amount of the lawyer's fee only
where recovery is substantial, they should have little, if any, effect on the prosecution
of smaller nuisance claims. Moreover, such legislation may have the adverse effect of
discouraging the prosecution of meritorious malpractice suits especially where the
patients' monetary recovery appears to be limited.
Comment, supra note 11, 45 FORDHAM L. Rv. at 1082. In particular, it was argued the
legislation would "hinder claims by seriously injured poor patients whose ability to sue is
dependent upon the contingency fee arrangement without which they could not afford coun-
sel." Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REv.
655, 671 (1976).
15. HEW REPORT, supra note 12, at 114 app. See also Sulnick, supra note 13, 15 CAL.
TRIAL LAW J. at 25 ("It is clear that the regulation of attorney fees is meant by The Act to
function as a means of reducing the number of malpractice suits, which, in turn, is supposed to
aid in the stabilization, if not reduction, of medical malpractice insurance premiums."); Com-
ment, supra note 11, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. at 1012, 1082 n.519; Comment, supra note 11, 52
S. CAL. L. REv. at 944 n.696; Comment, supra note 14, 50 TUL. L. REV. at 671.
16. The Assembly Select Committee on Medical Malpractice, for example, reported a
95% rejection rate of potential medical malpractice cases by attorneys. SELECT COMMITTEE
PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 8, at 43. A federal study concluded that medical malprac-
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On May 19, 1975, Governor Edmund 0. Brown, Jr. called the Cali-
fornia Legislature into an extraordinary session to deal with the medical
malpractice crisis. In his proclamation, the Governor articulated his rea-
sons for the unusual procedure:
The cost of medical malpractice insurance has risen to levels
which many physicians and surgeons find intolerable. The in-
ability of doctors to obtain such insurance at reasonable rates is
endangering the health of the people of this State, and threatens
the closing of many hospitals. The longer term consequences of
such closings could seriously limit the health care provided to
hundreds of thousands of our citizens.
In my judgment, no lasting solution is possible without
sacrifice and fundamental reform. It is critical that the Legisla-
ture enact laws which will change the relationship between the
people and the medical profession, the legal profession and the
insurance industry, and thereby reduce the costs which under-
lie these high insurance premiums.
17
The Governor requested a series of reforms including establishment
of reasonable limits on contingency fees charged by attorneys.'" In re-
sponse, the legislature enacted the Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act (MICRA), which included Business and Professions Code section
6146.19 California thus joined eighteen other states in responding to the
medical malpractice insurance crisis by enacting some type of contin-
gency fee control. ° By doing so, the legislature departed from a long-
tice attorneys accept only one out of four possible cases, and reject 41% of those cases because
of a lack of perceived liability. Dietz, Baird & Berul, The Medical Malpractice Legal System,
in HEW REPORT, supra note 8, at 97 app. The Dietz study concluded that there was a
high degree of concern by members of the plaintiffs' bar with obtaining a medical
opinion before accepting a case and the high degree of unsolicited response and con-
cern as to the client's motives or good faith. Both suggest that the plaintiff's bar is
professionally discharging its responsibility to society and to the medical profession
in screening medical malpractice claims.
Id. at 100 app.
17. 13 CAL. ASSEM. J., 1975-76 2d Ex. Sess. 2 (May 19, 1975) [hereinafter cited as 13 CAL,
ASSEM. J.]. For a discussion of the causes of this crisis, see supra note 3.
18. 13 CAL. ASSEM. J., supra note 17, at 3. The Governor also called for a reconstitution
of the Board of Medical Examiners, expansion of the Board's disciplinary authority, develop-
ment of a system to correct maldistribution of medical care, establishment of a Medical Peace
Corps., regulation of hospital rates, use of voluntary binding arbitration, elimination of collat-
eral source recovery and investigation of insurance rates. Id. at 2-3.
19. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, ch. 1 § 24.2, 1975-76 2d Ex. Sess., 2 CAL.
STAT. 3949, 3967-68 (1975) (approved by Governor Sept. 23, 1975, operative Dec. 12, 1975).
For text of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 see supra note 1.
20. Four of these states, Delaware, New Hampshire, New York and Pennsylvania, enacted
contingency fee sliding scales similar to California's. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6865
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standing tradition permitting parties to set the amount of an attorney's
compensation among themselves,21 and placed California among the few
(Supp. 1984); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:8 (1983); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 474-a (McKinney
1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.604 (Purdon Supp. 1985). The various fee scales would
have permitted attorney fees in the Roa case from a low of $90,000 in Delaware, $113,600 in
New Hampshire, $115,000 in Pennsylvania, to a high of $166,666 in New York. The Dela-
ware and Pennsylvania statutes have provisions allowing medical malpractice plaintiffs and
their attorneys to select a mutually agreeable per diem fee as an alternative to the sliding scale,
while New Hampshire plaintiffs could agree to pay a fee based on the reasonable value of the
attorney's services at the conclusion of the action. The New York and New Hampshire stat-
utes permit attorneys to apply to the court for a larger fee at the close of the action if the
increase is justified by extraordinary circumstances. Both the New Hampshire and Penn-
sylvania statutes have been held unconstitutional, while the Delaware statute was upheld by a
federal district court sitting in a diversity case. See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d
825 (1980); Heller v. Frankston, 76 Pa. Commw. 294, 464 A.2d 581 (1983), aft'd, 504 Pa. 528,
475 A.2d 1291 (1984); DeFillipo v. Beck, 520 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Del. 1981).
A few of the remaining states regulate contingency fees in medical malpractice cases by
establishing a maximum fee limit. See OR. REv. STAT. § 752.150 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-26-120 (1980). A similar Idaho statute, IDAHO CODE § 39:4213 (1977), was repealed in
1981. In addition, Indiana, which provides a patient compensation fund out of which damages
over $100,000 are paid, limits attorney fees from any award paid out of the fund to 15% but
gives a patient the right to elect to pay for attorney services on a per diem basis at the time of
employment. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-5-1 (1983). This statute was upheld by the Indiana
Supreme Court in Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
The remainder of the states chose to avoid setting any fee limit but require judicial ap-
proval of fees in individual cases. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-568 (1982); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.56 (West Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 671-2 (Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE
§ 147.138 (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7-121b (1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 3-2a-07 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2834 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.070
(Supp. 1985); WIS. STAT. § 655.013 (1983-84). Both the Maryland and Nebraska statutes have
survived constitutional challenges. See Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57,
appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657
(1977).
Federal legislation has recently been introduced to establish a contingency fee scale in all
medical malpractice actions. H.R. 2659, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., (1985).
21. Attorney fees in California are governed by § 1021 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which states that: "Except as attorney fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure
and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express
or implied, of the parties .... CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West 1980) (enacted in 1872).
A promise to pay a contingent fee must be made by an express contract. See 7 CAL. JUR.
3d, Attorneys at Law § 252 (1973) (and supporting cases). Generally, contingency fees must be
reasonable, and an attorney cannot recover a fee so excessive that it appears unreasonable. A
fee is unconscionable "when it is so exorbitant and wholly disproportionate to the services
performed as to shock the conscience of lawyers of ordinary prudence practicing in the same
community." RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL. Rule 2-107
(1980). Among the factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee are the
following:
(1) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite to
perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The amount involved and the results obtained.
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states to successfully regulate contingency fees in personal injury litiga-
tion by imposing a sliding fee scale.
2
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc. involved a direct constitutional
challenge to California's contingency fee statute. The plaintiffs, Frank
and Yvonne Roa, brought suit on behalf of their minor son against a
medical group, a doctor and a hospital for injuries he received during
birth. After a $500,000 settlement was reached between the Roas, the
medical group and the doctor, the plaintiffs petitioned the court for ap-
proval of the settlement and payment of a $90,798.00 fee out of the pro-
ceeds to their attorneys.2 3 The fee represented the maximum amount
allowable for a $500,000 judgment under section 6146 of the California
Business and Professions Code.24 However, the Roas later filed a second
petition requesting payment of twenty-five percent of the total judgment
(4) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(5) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(6) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services.
(7) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(8) The time and labor required.
(9) The informed consent of the client to the fee agreement.
Id See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d)(I)-(2) (1983). In Cali-
fornia, contingent fees of up to 50% have been upheld as reasonable. Estate of Raphael v.
Greene, 103 Cal. App. 2d 792, 230 P.2d 436 (1951). However, a contingent fee agreement
under which an attorney was to receive a 70% share has been held unconscionable and unen-
forceable. Jackson v. Campbell, 215 Cal. 103, 8 P.2d 845 (1932).
22. Both New York and New Jersey have rules governing contingency fees in all personal
injury litigation. See N.Y. CT. R. § 603.7(e) (McKinney 1984); N.J. Cr. R. Rule 1:21-7(c)
(West 1984) (originally enacted in 1976). Both rules have been held constitutional. See Gair
v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491, modified, 6 N.Y.2d 983, 161 N.E.2d
736, 191 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1959), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 374 (1960); American Trial Lawyers
Ass'n v. New Jersey, 126 N.J. Super. 577, 316 A.2d 19, afl'd, 66 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d 350
(1974). The Florida Supreme Court held that a similar sliding fee scale proposed for all per-
sonal injury actions by the Florida State Bar was unconstitutional. In re Florida Bar, 349
So.2d 630, 631 n.2 (1977).
23. 37 Cal. 3d 920, 924, 695 P.2d 164, 165, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77, 78. Section 3500(b) of the
California Probate Code requires judicial approval of a settlement involving a minor. CAL.
PROB. CODE § 3500(b) (West 1981). Section 3601 of that code provides that upon judicial
approval of such a settlement, "the court shall make a further order authorizing and directing
that... attorney fees, as the court shall approve... shall be paid from the money.., to be
paid... [to] the minor." CAL. PROB. CODE § 3601 (West 1981).
24. Under § 6146, the $90,798.00 fee breaks down approximately as follows: $20,000 fee
for the first $50,000; approximately $16,000 for the next $50,000; $25,000 for the next
$100,000; and $30,000 for the remaining $300,000. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West
Supp. 1985). For text of this statute, see supra note 1. These figures are not exact because the
Roas did not provide an exact itemization of the fee.
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to their attorneys.25 At the hearing on the second petition, the Roas tes-
tified that they were aware of the statutory limitations on attorney fees,
but that they believed their attorneys were "entitled" to the greater
amount.2 6 The trial court awarded the lower amount, finding that
although the twenty-five percent would have been a "fair and reason-
able" amount, the statutory limits prevented the higher award.2 7
The plaintiffs' attorneys appealed on the Roas' behalf, contending
that the statute violates the federal and state equal protection clauses, the
due process clause and the doctrine of separation of powers. A unani-
mous appellate court disagreed, finding the statute constitutional.28 A
sharply divided California Supreme Court affirmed the lower court rul-
ing by a vote of four to three. The United States Supreme Court, with
two dissents, refused to hear the Roas' appeal.2 9
IV. THE COURT'S REASONING
Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc. principally involved a facial chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the attorney fee limits embodied in sec-
tion 6146. In their due process arguments, the plaintiffs alleged that the
statute prevents or inhibits plaintiffs from retaining counsel of their
choice because the fee limits are so low they will discourage attorneys
from handling malpractice claims.30 In addition, the sliding scale nature
of the fee schedule creates a conflict of interest between an attorney and
client by reducing the attorney's incentive to push for a higher recov-
25. A fee of 25% would have totaled $125,000, an increase in payment to the attorneys of
approximately $35,000.
26. 37 Cal. 3d at 924, 695 P.2d at 165-66, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79.
27. Id., 695 P.2d at 166, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
28. 129 Cal. App. 3d 318, 181 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1982) (opinion by Reynoso, J., ordered
depublished). The appellate court noted the strange procedural posture of the case, pointing
out that although the attorneys' interest in their fee was adverse to their clients' interests, the
same attorneys were pursuing the appeal, purportedly on behalf of the clients. 181 Cal. Rptr.
at 46 n.l.
The California Supreme Court held, however, that although the attorneys may well have
had standing to appeal from the order setting their fees, it did not necessarily follow that the
plaintiffs themselves were not entitled to appeal. According to the court, the plaintiffs could
have considered themselves aggrieved because if the statutory limits remained in place, their
attorneys would have less of an incentive to pursue additional recovery against the remaining
defendants. 37 Cal. 3d at 925 n.4, 695 P.2d at 166 n.4, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79 n.4. The court did
not decide whether, as a matter of professional ethics, the potential conflict of interest required
separate representation of the attorneys and their clients. Id.
29. Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc., 53 U.S.L.W. 3344 (Nov. 18, 1985) (appeal dismissed
for lack of a substantial federal question; Justices Brennan and White would note probable
jurisdiction).
30. Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d 920, 925, 927-28, 695 P.2d 164, 166, 168,
211 Cal. Rptr. 77, 79, 81 (1985).
632 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:623
ery.3' The plaintiffs also attacked the statute as a violation of their sub-
stantive due process right to contract on the grounds that the limits
prevent a plaintiff from bargaining with an attorney to set an appropriate
fee. 32
While the Roas were clearly precluded from claiming that the stat-
ute had deprived them of the ability to obtain counsel, they did contend
that the sliding scale nature of the fee limits created a potential conflict of
interest because their attorneys continued to represent them against the
nonsettling defendants. Therefore, the Roas claimed, because the statute
potentially limited their attorneys to a fee of only ten percent of any re-
maining recovery, the attorneys would lack an incentive to fully prose-
cute the case, thus causing the Roas harm. 3
A. The Majority Opinion
The court in Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc. acknowledged that the
federal and state constitutions "embraced" a due process right to retain
counsel in civil cases, 34 but reasoned that legislative regulation of attor-
ney fees is well established and generally not "constitutionally suspect"
or the subject of "strict" judicial scrutiny.35 In reaching this conclusion,
the majority placed particular emphasis and reliance on Calhoun v. Mas-
sie, 36 a 1920 United States Supreme Court decision that upheld a federal
law limiting contingency fees to twenty percent in claims against the fed-
eral government.37 Additionally, because the plaintiffs had made no em-
31. Id. at 928, 695 P.2d at 169, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82.
32. Appellant's Petition for a Hearing by the California Supreme Court at 17, Roa v. Lodi
Medical Group, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985); Cal. Trial Law-
yers Ass'n, Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19, Roa v. Lodi Medical
Group, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985).
33. See supra note 28.
34. 37 Cal. 3d 920, 926, 695 P.2d 164, 166, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77, 79 (1985) (citing Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); Mendoza v. Small Claims Court, 49 Cal. 2d 668, 673, 321
P.2d 9, 12 (1958)).
35. Id. at 926-27, 695 P.2d at 166-67, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
36. 253 U.S. 170 (1920).
37. Id. at 173. In Calhoun, an attorney raised a due process challenge to the act, contend-
ing that it deprived him of rights to liberty and property protected by the fifth amendment.
The attorney had prosecuted a successful claim against the federal government for plaintiff
Massie, for a loss arising out of the Civil War. Prior to agreeing to represent Massie, Calhoun
secured a fee arrangement whereby Massie agreed to pay him 50% of any amount collected.
Calhoun won a $1900 judgment for Massie, payment of which required congressional ap-
proval. In the Omnibus Claims Act of 1915, Congress appropriated money for payment of
1115 claims, including Massie's. However, the claims bill required that" '[i]t shall be unlawful
for any ... attorney ... to ... collect, withhold or receive any sum which in the aggregate
exceeds twenty percentum of the amount of any item appropriated in this bill.'" Id. at 172
(quoting the Omnibus Claims Act of March 4, 1915, ch. 140, 38 Stat. 962). Payment of 20%
Dec. 1985] CONTINGENCY FEE LIMITS
pirical showing that the statute deprived plaintiffs of the ability to retain
counsel38 or that it created a particularly severe conflict of interest prob-
lem, 39 the court concluded that the statutory scheme did not constitute a
deprivation of due process.4°
The Roas' equal protection challenge was similarly dismissed by the
court.41 The plaintiffs had argued that the statute arbitrarily singles out
poor medical malpractice victims and irrationally regulates plaintiffs' but
not defendants' attorney fees. Claiming that the importance of the rights
affected required a high level of protection, the plaintiffs urged the court
to strictly scrutinize the statute and the legislative goals which led to its
enactment. However, finding that no suspect classifications42 or funda-
of Massie's claim was made to Calhoun by the government. The attorney then attempted to
collect an additional 30% from Massie by bringing suit in state court. After his claim was
denied, Calhoun sought a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court under the fifth amendment
for deprivation of his liberty and property. Id. at 173.
38. 37 Cal. 3d at 928, 930, 695 P.2d at 168, 169, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81, 82.
39. Id. at 929, 695 P.2d at 169, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 82. The court concluded that although
§ 6146 may affect the settings in which the attorney's and client's interests diverge, the statute
does not create the basic conflict of interest problem inherent in all contingency fee agree-
ments. See supra note 11.
40. 37 Cal. 3d at 929, 695 P.2d at 169, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
41. The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The clause
guarantees equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated. L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-1, at 993 (1978). As the Supreme Court re-
cently stated:
The initial discretion to determine what is "different" and what is "the same" resides
in the legislatures of the states. A legislature must have substantial latitude to estab-
lish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived,
that accommodate competing concerns both public and private, and that account for
limitations on the practical ability of the state to remedy every ill.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be
valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). However, where "suspect classifications" are drawn by a statute,
see infra note 42, the Court applies a strict scrutiny analysis, which shifts the burden and
requires the state to show a compelling purpose justifying the statute. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972).
42. The United States Supreme Court has found that suspect classifications include race,
illegitimacy and religious preference. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)
(per curiam). The Court has denied that classifications based on age or wealth are suspect or
otherwise require a strict level of scrutiny. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam) (age); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
(1973) (wealth). However, classifications based on gender or illegitimacy are subject to a
somewhat heightened review and must be shown to be substantially related to an important
state interest. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91
(1982) (illegitimacy). Further, the Court has stated that suspect groups include those
that have historically been relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.... Leg-
islation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circum-
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mental rights4 3 were involved, the court applied a "rational basis" test to
the statute, which predictably survived this minimal level of review.'
The Roa court relied on two of its earlier MICRA decisions, Ameri-
can Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hospital4" and Barme v. Wood,"
to determine whether a rational basis existed for the Act's attorney fee
provision.47 In both cases, the court had found that the legislative pur-
pose of the Act was to reduce the cost of medical malpractice insurance
and thereby (1) induce hospitals and doctors to resume providing medi-
cal care to all segments of society and (2) guarantee that insurance would
be available as compensation for patients injured through medical
malpractice.48
The attorney fee provision was rationally related to the foregoing
objectives, the Roa court concluded, because the statute would encourage
plaintiffs to accept lower settlements and would deter attorneys from in-
stances beyond their control suggests the kind of class or caste treatment that the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982) (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
The California Supreme Court has found that sex and poverty are additional suspect clas-
sifications prohibited by the California constitution. See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1,
485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (classifications based on sex held unconstitutional);
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) (classifications based
on wealth, combined with a denial of the fundamental right of education, constituted equal
protection violation), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Committee to Defend Reproductive
Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981) (statutory restric-
tions on poor women's rights to obtain abortion held unconstitutional denial of equal
protection).
43. The equal protection clause also protects individuals from statutory schemes which
establish classifications that infringe on constitutionally guaranteed fundamental interests.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982). If a fundamental interest is involved, the state
must demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling gov-
ernment interest. Id. The Supreme Court has found that express or implied fundamental
rights under the United States Constitution include: the right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right to vote, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); the right to
privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); the right to marry and procreate, Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); and the rights of free speech and assembly guaranteed
by the first amendment, Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). The California
Supreme Court has found that rights guaranteed by the state constitution are also fundamen-
tal. People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 231 P.2d 832 (1951). Both the
United States and California Supreme Courts have impliedly rejected the view that the right to
sue in tort is fundamental. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59 (1978); Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
44. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 931, 695 P.2d at 170, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
45. 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984).
46. 37 Cal. 3d 174, 689 P.2d 446, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1984).
47. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 930, 695 P.2d at 170, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
48. Id.
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stituting frivolous suits.4 9 The court also found that because other
MICRA provisions reduce malpractice victims' recoveries, the attorney
fee limits were necessary to protect their awards from further depletion
by high contingency fees.5" Thus, because of this special need, the legis-
lature could have rationally chosen to regulate plaintiff but not defense
attorney fees.51 The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the fee
scale itself was arbitrary and discriminated against more severely injured
plaintiffs. It concluded that the legislature could have reasonably deter-
mined that the sliding scale approach produces more equitable fees and
prevents windfalls to attorneys representing the very seriously injured. 2
Quickly disposing of the plaintiffs' final challenge, the court summa-
rily dismissed the contention that the regulation of attorney fees was a
matter left solely to the judicial branch. The court concluded that Cali-
fornia authority "expressly" permits legislative action to set reasonable
fees and that section 6146, therefore, does not violate the California Con-
stitution's separation of powers provision. 3
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Bird's dissent sharply contrasts with the tone and con-
clusions of the majority opinion. The Chief Justice strenuously argued
that section 6146 impinges upon medical malpractice victims' first
amendment rights to petition the government for redress of grievances
and imposes fee limits based upon the content of the views they wish to
present to the court. The controls were therefore subject to strict judicial
scrutiny, and must fail because they lack a "compelling" purpose.5 4
Challenging the majority's questionable presumption of the facts, the
Chief Justice also concluded that the fee limits significantly interfere with
the right of malpractice victims to obtain attorneys of their choice and
sharply exacerbate the conflict of interest between plaintiffs and their at-
torneys. 5 As a result, the statute is violative of the due process clause
because it is not sufficiently related to the purposes it was enacted to
achieve.
5 6
Concluding that the statute also violates the equal protection clause
49. Id. at 931, 695 P.2d at 170-71, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83-84.
50. Id. at 932, 695 P.2d at 171, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 933, 695 P.2d at 172, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 84-85.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 942, 695 P.2d at 178, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 91 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 944, 695 P.2d at 180, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 93 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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because it selectively burdens a suspect group,57 Chief Justice Bird not
only criticized the majority for failing to apply a high level of judicial
scrutiny, but also argued that section 6146 should not have withstood
"any meaningful level of judicial review."58 Continuing a debate that
began in American Bank and Trust Co. v. Community Hospital,59 the first
MICRA case, the Chief Justice accused the majority of misapplying the
"rational basis" test in its review of the Act's provisions. According to
Chief Justice Bird, the California Constitution requires that legislative
classifications bear a "substantial and rational" relation to a legitimate
state purpose.6 0 The court must decide whether a legislative goal is real-
istically conceivable and must conduct a "'serious and genuine judicial
inquiry into the correspondence between the classification and the legis-
lative goals.' ,61 Section 6146 does not meet this test because the rela-
tionship between plaintiffs' attorney fees and insurance premiums is
speculative and indirect.62 If the fee control was intended instead to limit
frivolous suits, the Chief Justice reasoned, then the regulation is not con-
sistent with the narrow reach of MICRA because frivolous suits occur in
all types of litigation and may in fact be less likely in the medical mal-
practice area.63
The Chief Justice dismissed the view that the legislature intended to
protect malpractice victims from further reduction of their recoveries,
pointing out that the statute did nothing to ensure that plaintiffs would
be able to obtain attorneys at the lower fees or that they would actually
retain a higher percentage of their recoveries."4 Accordingly, Chief Jus-
tice Bird reasoned, the restrictions on the malpractice victim's ability to
hire an attorney could not be reconciled with any of MICRA's asserted
purposes and were thus violative of equal protection guarantees.65
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
The Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc. majority's decision to apply a
rational basis test to section 6146 perpetuates a debate among members
57. Id. at 949, 695 P.2d at 183, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
59. See infra notes 265-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of this debate.
60. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
61. Id, 695 P.2d at 183-84, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 96-97 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Newland v. Board of Governors, 19 C I. 3d 705, 711, 566 P.2d 254, 258, 139
Cal. Rptr. 620, 624 (1977)).
62. Id. at 952-53, 695 P.2d at 186, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 99 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 951, 695 P.2d at 185, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 98 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
64. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 952, 695 P.2d at 185-86, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 99 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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of the California Supreme Court concerning the appropriate level of def-
erence to be accorded legislative enactments. In addition, the majority's
treatment of the first amendment issues raises more questions than an-
swers, particularly in light of several recent United States Supreme Court
first amendment decisions. This Note will explore whether the first
amendment does indeed protect a litigant's selection and payment of an
attorney, and if so, what level of protection the Constitution demands.
Second, this Note will discuss the due process and equal protection issues
raised by contingency fee limits and the majority and dissent's contrary
approaches to the rational basis test in both areas. Finally, this Note will
consider the implications of the Roa opinion with respect to both its es-
tablishment of a new benchmark of judicial scrutiny and its reliability as
precedent for further legislative control of attorney fees.
A. The First Amendment-Contingency Fees as a Form of Speech
1. The litigant's right to select an advocate
In practical terms, attorney fees represent the payment of money in
return for professional services. While such a transaction at its most ele-
mentary level is merely a private commercial agreement, similar to hiring
an architect to design a building, the primary objective of most legal em-
ployment is the effective advocacy of an idea or position. That objective
casts first amendment overtones to the issue of attorney fee regulation.
Both attorney advertisements and solicitation of clients have been
found to constitute forms of speech.66 Regulation of both practices, how-
ever, has been justified on the ground that they constitute speech of a
more commercial nature, particularly where the attorney's primary goal
is monetary remuneration.67 However, where the goal of legal employ-
ment has been to pursue a client's civil or political rights, attorneys' at-
tempts to obtain clients have been given the highest level of protection
under the first amendment.68
Payment of attorney fees is the reverse side of this transaction. Fees
are determined or paid once an attorney has been found and a client
desires that attorney's representation in a particular matter. The first
question, then, is whether the payment of attorney fees should also be
afforded first amendment protection, and if so, how much. Should an
attorney be considered the means by which a client's views are expressed,
like a newspaper advertisment or megaphone? If the answer is yes, the
66. See infra notes 84-113 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 136-49 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
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second question concerns the appropriate level of first amendment pro-
tection. Should judicial scrutiny be less stringent if the client's objective
is personal economic well-being or redress of a private wrong, rather
than attainment of a political or civil right shared by other citizens?
The United States Supreme Court has recently addressed the first
question. While its initial response appears to be negative, an analysis of
the Court's reasoning reveals that it has chosen, for now, to avoid the
question. In Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors,6" the
Court upheld a 120 year old law prohibiting the payment by veterans of
more than $10 to attorneys handling their claims for Veterans' Adminis-
tration benefits.7' A federal district court judge had enjoined the en-
forcement of the statute pending a constitutional challenge by various
aggrieved veterans who claimed that they had been unable to find an
attorney because of the limitation.7" The district court's ruling focused
on both the veterans' due process and first amendment claims and articu-
lated a cohesive first amendment rationale72 that was subsequently
adopted and expanded by California's Chief Justice Bird in her Roa v.
Lodi Medical Group, Inc. dissent.7"
Reversing the district court in a six to three decision, the Supreme
Court narrowly framed the question as one of due process and upheld the
limitation based upon the view that the veterans' claim system was
designed by Congress to be a simple administrative and nonadversarial
forum favoring the claimants.74 The Court defined the first amendment
issue as the claimants' right to pay someone to speak for them which, if
limited, would deny them access to the courts. Since such access is also a
due process right, the Court reasoned that it was inseparable from the
plaintiffs' first amendment claims and had not been infringed because the
claimants had only been denied the right to an attorney in the nonadver-
69. 105 S. Ct. 3180 (1985).
70. 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c)(2) imposes a $10 limit on the fee that may be paid to an attorney
or agent who represents a veteran seeking benefits from the Veterans' Administration for death
or disability connected with military service. 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c)(2) (1982). Section 3405
provides criminal penalties for any person who charges fees in excess of the limitation. 38
U.S.C. § 3405 (1982). Section 3404 has been on the books for more than 120 years. Walters,
105 S. Ct. at 3189.
71. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1984),
rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3180 (1985).
72. 589 F. Supp. at 1314-27.
73. 37 Cal. 3d 920, 938-39, 695 P.2d 164, 175-76, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77, 88-89 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
74. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3183-84 ("[Tlhe process prescribed by Congress for obtaining
disability benefits does not contemplate the adversary mode of dispute resolution utilized by
courts in this country.... The process is designed to function throughout with a high degree
of informality and solicitude for the claimant.").
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sarial claims process, not the courts." The exclusion of attorneys from
the claims process was not a violation of the veterans' due process rights,
the Court reasoned, because meaningful alternatives for presenting a
claim without the aid of an attorney were available.76
As pointed out by Justice Stevens in dissent, however, the Court
ignored the veterans' independent first amendment rights of association
and speech." The majority opinion did not directly address or reject the
district court's first amendment reasoning. Although the majority ac-
knowledged that the first amendment may protect a client's right to an
attorney in a judicial context, when no meaningful alternative to attor-
neys is available, its decision does not resolve the issue raised in Roa:
whether, under the first amendment, a litigant has an unrestricted right
to employment of counsel in an adversarial courtroom setting.7s
2. The right to petition the courts
The rights of free speech guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 3 of
the California Constitution, expressly include the right to "petition the
75. Id. at 3197.
76. Id. "[Various veterans organizations across the country make available trained service
agents, free of charge, to assist claimants in developing and presenting their claims." Id. at
3184.
77. Id. at 3215 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[W]e are not considering a procedural right that
would involve any cost to the Government. We are concerned with the individual's right to
spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance of independent counsel in advancing
his claim against the Government.... [I]n civil disputes with the Government, I believe that
right is ...protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the First
Amendment." (emphasis added)).
78. See infra note 116. The majority found that the nature of the underlying interest at
stake was "determinative of the right to employ counsel." Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3196. Thus,
the Court found dispositive the fact that the property interest at stake only involved supple-
mental Veterans' Administration benefits not granted on the basis of need. Id. The Court
distinguished Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) which held that attorney representation
was essential to protect eligible recipients from denial of welfare benefits and "the very means
by which to live." Id. at 264. The Court likened the Walters case to Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976), where it held that no evidentiary hearing was required prior to temporary
deprivation of social security benefits. Walters, 105 S. Ct. at 3196.
The Roa plaintiffs claim that the liberty interest at stake in their case, the right to be made
whole and to "obtain judicial relief for unjustified intrusions on personal security," warrants
the right to employ an attorney. See Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement to the Supreme
Court of the United States at 27, Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc. 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d
164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)). The
appellants also rely on Marbury v. Madison in support of their claim: "The very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49, 58 (1803), cited in Appellant's
Jurisdictional Statement to the Supreme Court of the United States at 27, Roa v. Lodi Medical
Group, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985).
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government for redress of grievances."7 9 This right of petition encom-
passes a right of access to the courts to resolve civil disputes between
private parties and, specifically, to obtain monetary compensation."0
Economic activity essential to the effective exercise of these rights may be
restricted only where necessary to serve a compelling government inter-
est.8 Therefore, if payment of attorney fees is essential in the judicial
arena to the effective exercise of an individual's right to petition the
courts for redress, statutory limits on such expenditures must be strictly
scrutinized. 2 Additionally, attorney fee limits, such as section 6146,
which only regulate fees paid by medical malpractice plaintiffs, may run
afoul of the constitutional ban on content discrimination and should,
therefore, be subject to a "particularly vigorous scrutiny."83
The first amendment argument advanced by Chief Justice Bird in
Roa and Justice Stevens in Walters hinges upon an analogy between ex-
penditure of funds to express views in the political arena and expenditure
of funds to resolve claims in the judicial context. It rests upon the as-
sumption that a suit between private citizens in civil court falls within the
protected ambit of the right to petition for redress of grievances. If the
cases relied upon by both Justices support these assumptions, then a
strict scrutiny analysis must be applied to statutes regulating contingency
fees. Accordingly, unless a "compelling" government purpose exists for
limiting attorney fees paid by medical malpractice plaintiffs, such statutes
should be declared unconstitutional.
The premise that the constitutional right to petition the government
79. The first amendment provides that: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNST. amend. I. Additionally, the
California Constitution provides that: "The people have the right to instruct their representa-
tives, petition government for redress of grievances, and assemble freely to consult for the
common good." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
80. See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11
(1972); United Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 578-79 (1971); United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d 527, 532-
34, 645 P.2d 137, 183 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1095 (1983);
Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 914, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
81. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 937, 695 P.2d at 175, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (Bird, C.J., dissenting)
(citing Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 51-54 (1976)). See also FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 105 S.
Ct. 1459, 1467-68 (1985).
82. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 939, 695 P.2d at 176-77, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
83. Id. at 940, 695 P.2d at 177, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 90 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (citing Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Environmental Planning & Information
Council v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 188, 680 P.2d 1086, 203 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1984)).
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encompasses civil suits between private parties is well founded. In a se-
ries of decisions, the United States Supreme Court has gradually re-
moved restrictions governing the referral and employment of attorneys in
civil cases on the basis that such regulations infringe upon this right.
Beginning with NAACP w Button,8" the Supreme Court recognized
that private litigation is a form of political expression. In Button, the
Court struck down a Virginia statute prohibiting the solicitation by attor-
neys of any legal or professional business.85 The NAACP had been as-
sisting individuals in preparing and prosecuting civil rights litigation and
had channqled individuals with such claims to various civil rights attor-
neys.86 After the Virginia courts had held that the NAACP's activities
fell within the prohibitions of the statute, the NAACP sued to prevent
enforcement of the provisions.87 Holding that the first amendment pro-
tects vigorous advocacy against government intrusion, the Court de-
clared the statute unconstitutional because it posed a grave "danger of
smothering all discussion looking to the eventual institution of litiga-
tion."88 The Court rejected the state's contention that its well estab-
lished interest in regulating the legal profession and preventing illegal
practices justified the statute.89 The Court found no showing "of a seri-
ous danger here of professionally reprehensible conflicts of interest which
rules against solicitation frequently seek to prevent."9
The Supreme Court has not limited this view to cases involving civil
or political rights and has continued to strike down statutes which limit
the means by which individuals obtain attorneys to represent them in
civil lawsuits. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia,9 the
Court dismissed an injunction obtained by the Virginia State Bar which
had prevented the Brotherhood from assisting railroad workers and their
families in preparing legal claims resulting from job related injuries. The
union had referred individuals to attorneys it believed were competent to
84. 371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963).
85. Chapter 33 of the Virginia Acts of Assembly, ex. sess. 1956, broadened Virginia stat-
utes defining attorney malpractice to include acceptance of employment or compensation from
any person or organization not a party to a judicial proceeding. It also made it unlawful for
any such person or organization to solicit business for an attorney. Button, 371 U.S. at 426-27
(citing 1956 Va. Acts of Assembly, ch. 33).
86. 371 U.S. at 419-22.
87. Id. at 426 (quoting NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960)).
88. Id. at 434.
89. Id. at 439. The state contended that the statute was necessary to prevent the illegal
practices of barratry, maintenance and champerty. Id.
90. Id. at 443.
91. 377 U.S. I (1964).
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handle such claims.92 The Court held that the first amendment guaran-
tees of free speech, petition and assembly protected the workers' right to
consult with attorneys and the union's right to recommend lawyers to
handle their claims.93 Although the Court acknowledged that the state
had broad powers to regulate the practice of law, it held that states could
not, by invoking that power, "infringe in any way the right of individuals
... to be fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress." 94 Lay-
men, the Court stated, cannot be expected to know how to protect their
rights when dealing with practiced and carefully counseled adversaries,
and associating to help one another enforce their rights could not be con-
demned as a threat to legal ethics.95 Accordingly, the Court held, "[t]he
state can no more keep these workers from using their cooperative plan
to advise one another than it could use more direct means to bar them
from resorting to the courts to vindicate their legal rights. "96 Further, as
in Button, the Court concluded that the state had failed to show any
appreciable public interest in preventing the challenged activity.97
Following the Trainmen decision, the Court upheld a union's right
to hire an attorney to represent its members in connection with workers
compensation claims. In United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Associa-
tion,98 the state bar association had sought an injunction against the
union's activity as an unauthorized practice of law.99 The Illinois
Supreme Court upheld the injunction, concluding that Button only gov-
erned litigation involving political expression, that Trainmen only pro-
tected consultation and advice, and that neither decision permitted a
union to actually hire and pay an attorney fees on behalf of its mem-
bers."° The Supreme Court reversed, holding that its decisions in But-
ton and Trainmen were controlling, and that first amendment protection
extended beyond speech and assembly characterized as political to
speech involving private rights.10 1 In addition, as with both previous de-
cisions, the Court again found that the state had offered no compelling
reason for prohibiting the challenged activity.102 The Court noted that
the dangers of baseless litigation and conflicts of interest had been raised
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 6.
94. Id at 7.
95. Id.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 8.
98. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
99. Id. at 218.
100. Id. at 221.
101. Id. at 223.
102. Id. at 224.
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in both Button and Trainmen, but that in both cases, as here, those dan-
gers were far too remote and speculative to justify the broad
prohibitions. 
103
The Court addressed these questions again in United Transportation
Union v. Michigan Bar,"° when it upheld the right of a union to recom-
mend selected attorneys to its members and to secure a commitment
from those attorneys that the maximum fee charged would not exceed
twenty-five percent of any recovery. The state bar had sought an injunc-
tion against the union, primarily to eliminate the fee restriction. An in-
junction was granted by the state courts prohibiting the union from,
among other things, "controlling, directly or indirectly, the fees charged
... by any lawyer."' 0 5 The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the
basic right to group legal action allows a cooperative union of workers to
protect its members from excessive fees at the hands of inadequate coun-
sel. "6 It explained that the common thread, beginning with Button and
running through this series of cases, was that "collective activity under-
taken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right
within the protection of the First Amendment."' 1 7 That right would be
a hollow promise, the Court concluded, if courts could deny associations
of workers or others the means of enabling their members to meet the
costs of legal representation. 10 8
Finally, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,1"9 the Court held that the
free speech principle underlying the NAACP and union attorney solicita-
tion cases extended to individual efforts to obtain legal assistance. The
Bates case raised the issue of the constitutionality of an American Bar
Association prohibition against lawyer advertisement.°"0 The Bar's disci-
plinary rule had been applied to an attorney who sought to publicize his
rates and services. In striking down the ban and holding that truthful,
nonmisleading advertising by lawyers was a protected form of speech,"'I
the Court emphasized the need for such avertisement to enable consum-
ers to obtain representation. The Court particularly noted that legal
services were being underutilized and that although advertising might
103. Id. at 223.
104. 401 U.S. 576 (1970).
105. Id. at 579 n.4.
106. Id. at 585. See infra note 115 and accompanying text for further discussion concerning
the United Transportation Union holding.
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 585-86.
109. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
110. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1982).
111. 433 U.S. at 383-84.
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increase the use of judicial machinery, "we cannot accept the notion that
it is always better for a person to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it
by legal action."' 1 2 The Court stated that its underlying concern was
that "the aggrieved receive information regarding their legal rights and
the means of effectuating them," 1 3 a concern which applies to aggrieved
individuals with at least as much force as it does to groups.14 The Bates
decision recognized that the right to consult an attorney is not limited
solely to the associational aspects of the first amendment, but includes the
individual's right to obtain an attorney's representation in the judicial
system.
These decisions establish that the means by which a litigant obtains
access to the courts is as much protected by the first amendment as the
speech in the courtroom itself. Despite governmental interests that his-
torically supported state regulation of attorneys, the Supreme Court in
each case considered whether the right to petition the courts was in any
way impacted. Specifically, in United Transportation Union, the Court
implicitly recognized that the amount an attorney may be paid is one
function of judicial access within the scope of first amendment free-
doms. 115 Although that case did uphold a fee limit, the restriction was
imposed by private agreement, not government action, with the result
that access was improved, not restricted. Thus, any law, such as section
6146 of the California Business and Professions Code, which impacts the
individual's selection and payment of an advocate must be evaluated in
light of these special first amendment concerns.
3. The contingency fee's role in the selection and advocacy process
In addition to the right of access to the courts and rights of associa-
tion protected by these decisions, the first amendment also incorporates a
right to choose a particular spokesperson to present one's claims." 6 The
112. Id. at 376.
113. Id. at 376 n.32.
114. Id.
115. While United Transportation Union involved a limit on attorney fees to prevent abuse,
that limit was made by private agreement between the attorneys and the -union on behalf of its
members. 401 U.S. at 577. The union's use of its numerical strength to bargain for low rates
in order to ensure its members affordable attorneys was an associational right protected by the
first amendment, according to the Court. If the union had found any difficulty in obtaining
qualified attorneys at that rate, it presumably would not have been prevented from bargaining
for a new rate. Further, if the individual members of the union were dissatisfied with the
attorneys to whom they were referred, or wished to retain an attorney at a higher rate, they
presumably would not have been prevented from taking such action.
116. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 105 S. Ct. 2757, 2766 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("A fundamental premise of the adversary system is that individuals have the
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exercise of that right is intimately connected with the payment of attor-
ney fees and has independent first amendment significance, particularly
in the adversarial judicial context.1" 7 The Supreme Court's decisions in
Buckley v. Valeo "8 and Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Mun-
son Co. 1 9 compel such a result.
a. expenditure of money in connection with first amendment activities
In Buckley v. Valeo,"2° the Supreme Court expressly considered
whether the use of money in connection with speech activities is a form
of communication protected by the first amendment. The Buckley Court
addressed the constitutionality of a provision of the 1971 Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act which prohibited independent expenditures of more
than $1000 in political campaigns.' 21 In holding that such expenditures
were a protected form of speech, the Court stated that it had "never
suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of
money operates.., to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First
Amendment." '22 A restriction on the amount of money an individual
can spend necessarily reduces the quantity of expression, because "virtu-
ally every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires
the expenditure of money." 123 The expenditure limits imposed "direct
and substantial" restraints on political speech 24 that, according to the
right to retain the attorney of their choice to represent their interests in judicial proceedings.");
id. at 2767 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Everyone must agree that the litigant's freedom to choose
his own lawyer in a civil case is a fundamental right.").
117. The Supreme Court has initially ignored this separate issue, concluding in Walters that
the interest affected was of due process, not first amendment origin. Walters v. National Ass'n
of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3190, 3197 (1985). Although the Walters majority acknowl-
edged the Mine Workers line of decisions, it distinguished these cases, concluding that they
addressed only a first amendment right to associate collectively for the common good, rather
than a first amendment right of access to the courts separate from any due process claim. Id.
at 3196. The interest at stake in Walters was articulated as an "individual interest in best
prosecuting a claim," which is "inseparable from [the claimants'] due process claims." Id. at
3196-97. The key issue, according to the Court, was whether the claimants had "meaningful
access." Thus, even if a first amendment interest attached to the claimants' right to pay a
surrogate speaker, it would do so only in the absence of a" 'meaningful' alternative." Id. As a
result, since the Court had previously determined under its due process analysis that the Veter-
ans' Administration claimants did not need attorneys in order to present their claims, it con-
cluded that the plaintiffs' first amendment claim had "no independent significance." Id.
118. 424 U.S. 1 (1975) (plurality opinion).
119. 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984).
120. 424 U.S. 1 (1975) (plurality opinion).
121. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(e)(1), 88 Stat. 1263, 1265 (1974), repealed by Pub. L. No.
94-283, tit. 2 § 201(a), 90 Stat. 496 (1976).
122. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
123. Id. at 19.
124. Id. at 39.
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Court, "fail[ed] to serve any substantial governmental interest in stem-
ming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process."'' 25
As Chief Justice Bird pointed out in Roa, the expenditure of money
for attorney fees is no less essential to the exercise of first amendment
rights. 126 The ability to pay an attorney to present views to the court is
analogous to paying a newspaper or television station to broadcast polit-
ical messages to the public. 127 Clearly, one could not obtain the same
result in either case without monetary access to the conduit through
which views are transmitted to their intended audience. Just as political
parties seek highly paid spokespersons for their causes, a client selects an
attorney based upon the nature and focus of the message he or she wishes
to communicate to a particular audience. Thus, if individuals are pre-
vented from obtaining the spokesperson of their choice, who they believe
can most effectively advocate their position, then they are not being given
the "meaningful access" that the constitution demands.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Secretary of State v. Joseph
H. Munson Co.,128 even more directly establishes that limits on the ex-
penditure of money, even for nonpolitical advocacy, are incompatible
with the first amendment. In Munson, a Maryland statute prohibited
charitable organizations from paying professional fund raisers more than
twenty-five percent of any amount generated by fund raising activities. 29
Munson, a professional fund raising company, challenged the act as an
unconstitutional infringement of the first amendment rights of speech
and assembly.130 The Court agreed and struck down the provision.
The Court first found that the first amendment protects solicitation
125. Id. at 47-48. The Court further held that the governmental interest in equalizing the
relative ability of individuals to influence the outcome of elections did not justify the limitation
on express advocacy. Id. at 48. According to the Court, "[t]he First Amendment's protection
against government abridgment of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a
person's financial ability to engage in public discussion." Id. at 49. See also FEC v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985) (Buckley relied upon to strike
down a limitation on expenditures by political action committees). The Court stated, "al-
lowing for the presentation of views while forbidding the expenditure of more than $1000 to
present them is much like allowing a speaker in a public hall to express his views while denying
him the use of an amplifying system." Id. at 1467.
126. 37 Cal. 3d at 938, 695 P.2d at 175, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
127. Although it could be argued that individuals may represent themselves in court, most
courts have recognized that counsel may be necessary to effectively advocate a position. See
Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) ("The right to be heard would be, in many cases,
of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.") (quoting Powell v.
Alabama, 289 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
128. 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984).
129. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 103D (1982), reprinted in Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2844 n.2.
130. Although Munson was not a charity and did not claim that its own first amendment
rights had been infringed, the Court concluded that it had standing as a sufficiently injured
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of funds by private charitable organizations because such activity is inter-
twined with speech "seeking support for particular causes or for particu-
lar views on economic, political, or social issues."' 131 Thus, even though
the state had a legitimate interest in preventing fraud and the misdirec-
tion of funds from an organization's charitable purposes, limiting the
amount charities could spend to hire fund raisers was an inappropriate
means of correcting such abuses. The Court found the Maryland limita-
tion fatally flawed because it was based on the mistaken premise that a
charity's high solicitation expenses and fund raising fees were an accurate
measure of fraud. 132 Because the statute would preclude legitimate solic-
itation activity that resulted in high costs without directly preventing a
misdirection of funds, the Court held that the statute was an impermissi-
ble direct restriction on protected free speech. 3 3 Further, although the
statute included a waiver provision that allowed the state to issue a per-
mit on a showing that the limitation would effectively prevent a charita-
ble organization from raising funds,13 1 the Court refused to uphold the
statute because groups choosing to pay high costs to advocate their views
would still be impermissibly denied access to solicitation permits.'35
Percentage limitations on attorney fees embodied in section 6146 of
the California Business and Professions Code and similar statutes are di-
rectly comparable to the fund raising percentage limitation in Munson.
The attorney fee limits prevent a client from agreeing to pay more than a
specified statutory percentage, just as the limit in Munson prevented a
charitable group from paying more than a specified percentage as a fee
for professional fund raising assistance. While the fund raising limit was
designed to prevent fraud on the part of the charitable group, it also
acted to hold down purportedly unreasonable professional fees, thereby
third party because the ordinance had prevented it from obtaining contracts from charitable
organizations. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2848.
131. Id. at 2849 (quoting Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444
U.S. 620, 632 (1980)). In Schaumburg, the Court struck down an ordinance that required
charitable organizations to obtain permits to solicit door-to-door. A charity could obtain a
permit only if it proved that it directly used at least 75% of its solicitations for charitable
purposes. The ordinance was based on the belief that any group using more than 25% of its
funds for administrative purposes was not a "charitable organization," and thus any such en-
terprise representing itself as a charity was fraudulent. The Court found that although the
Village had a legitimate interest in preventing fraud, those interests could be served by meas-
ures less intrusive than a direct prohibition on solicitation. Thus, under the first amendment,
the limitation was invalid because it was insufficiently related to the governmental interests
asserted to justify its interference with protected speech. 444 U.S. at 637-39.
132. Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2852.
133. Id. at 2853.
134. Id. at 2850.
135. Id. at 2850-51, 2853.
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freeing more funds for the charitable goals of the group. Similarly, the
attorney fee limit is purportedly aimed in part at preventing unreasona-
ble fees and giving clients a greater share of the recovery.
In Munson the Supreme Court found that the fund raising limit
might prevent some groups from undertaking fund raising activities be-
cause they would be unable to keep their costs below the twenty-five per-
cent limit. The argument propounded by the plaintiffs in Roa raised the
very same point. They contended that contingency fee limits might pre-
vent them from advocating their position in a court because the restric-
tions would make it impossible for them to obtain an attorney to
represent them. Only by paying a fee greater than permitted under the
statute would they have been able to exercise fully their protected first
amendment activities. While the Maryland statute directly prevented so-
licitation activity by refusing permits to groups unable to meet the statu-
tory limitation, the indirect prohibition induced by the percentage fee
limits in Roa produces the same result.
b. the level of first amendment protection: does the
client's goal make a difference?
A distinguishing feature between the Munson and Roa cases is the
first amendment activity undertaken by the plaintiffs in each. In Mun-
son, the charitable groups sought to spread their political, economic or
social views to the public by way of solicitation. Medical malpractice
victims, in contrast, seek to present their individual cases to a court and
seek redress for their injuries. This second form of speech, some might
argue, is less deserving of first amendment protection as it is more akin to
commercial speech.
Speech which merely proposes a commercial transaction and which
involves primarily economic interests contains elements deserving of
some, albeit less demanding, first amendment protection. 136 Commercial
speech has been found to enlighten public decision-making and contrib-
ute to the free flow of information on matters of general public inter-
est. 137 However, because commercial speech is thought to be more easily
verifiable and durable than, for example, political commentary, regula-
tion has been permitted with respect to time, place and manner and to
prohibit deceptive or misleading advertisements. 38 As the Supreme
136. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976).
137. Id. at 764-65.
138. Id. at 771-72. The Court stated that:
There are commonsense differences between speech that does "no more than propose
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Court stated in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,139 "the State does
not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the
public whenever speech is a component of that activity.""
Ohralik and its companion case, In re Primus,"' involved the first
amendment right of lawyers to solicit clients. In Primus, an ACLU at-
torney was reprimanded for improperly attempting to retain a client in
an illegal sterilization case by writing her a letter offering free representa-
tion.142 The attorney in Ohralik, embarked on an in-person solicitation
of a personal injury victim in a manner commonly referred to as "ambu-
lance chasing."' 43 Ohralik was reprimanded for violating attorney disci-
plinary rules prohibiting such solicitation. 1"
The Supreme Court evaluated the type of speech in both cases, con-
cluding that the communication in Primus was of a more political nature
and not primarily aimed at pecuniary gain for the attorney. 145 As a re-
sult, the Court reviewed the effect of the disciplinary rule with the high-
est level of scrutiny applicable to political and associational first
amendment rights. 46 In contrast, the Court in Ohralik characterized the
attorney's conduct as serving primarily to advance his own personal
profit and concluded that it was therefore subject to regulation as com-
mercial speech. 47 Under a lower level of scrutiny, the ban on in-person
solicitation was found to be an appropriate regulation designed to protect
individuals from overreaching and to maintain the high standards of the
legal profession."' According to the Court, "[a] lawyer's procurement
of remunerative einployment is a subject only marginally affected with
a commercial transaction," . . . and other varieties.... [These differences] suggest
that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful
and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired. The truth of commercial
speech, for example may be more easily verifiable ... than ... news reporting or
political commentary.... Also, commercial speech may be more durable than other
kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likeli-
hood of its being chilled by proper regulation and foregone entirely.
Id. at 771 n.24 (citations omitted).
139. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
140. Id. at 456.
141. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
142. Id. at 416-17.
143. 436 U.S. at 449-52, 467.
144. Id. at 453.
145. 436 U.S. at 422.
146. Id. at 428-29. The Court found that the attorney's conduct was protected by its deci-
sion in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See supra notes 84-90.
147. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455. According to the Court, "[i]n-person solicitation by a lawyer
of remunerative employment is a business transaction in which speech is an essential but
subordinate component. While this does not remove the speech from the protection of the
First Amendment ... it lowers the level of appropriate judicial scrutiny." Id. at 457.
148. Id. at 460-61.
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First Amendment concerns."
' 149
These decisions, on the surface, seem to indicate that transactions
concerning legal representation deserve a lower level of first amendment
protection and are subject to reasonable regulation unless the object of
the employment is pursuit of civil or political rights. As a result, because
suits for redress of injuries by medical malpractice victims are essentially
private concerns, and attorneys accept such employment for monetary
gain, regulations such as section 6146 of the California Business and Pro-
fessions Code would seem acceptable. However, such a result ignores the
basic difference in the regulations imposed on lawyer solicitation and ad-
vertising as compared to limits on attorney fees.
The disciplinary rules attacked in Primus and Ohralik were directed
at attorney overreaching and did not in any manner affect the right of the
client to make an independent selection of an attorney or to hire an advo-
cate for an agreed upon fee. Further, the attorney advertising and solici-
tation rules merely make it easier for the client to make a knowing and
independent selection of an attorney, without undue influence or pres-
sure. Attorney fee limits such as section 6146, however, go further by
limiting the client's choice of counsel, contrary to decisions of the
Supreme Court supporting greater access to attorneys. 150 Prevention of
overreaching by attorneys is merely a fortuitous result of the statute.)51
The selection of an advocate to present one's views in the civil jus-
tice system carries with it more significant first amendment concerns
than the right to receive or present commercial advertising information.
State interference with the selection process poses a greater danger of
inhibition of speech that may be bound up with a particular political or
social perspective. More is at stake than simply a businessman's profits.
The goals of the individual malpractice plaintiff extend beyond personal
compensation. Private litigation, in fact, exists as a supplement to public
licensing and quality control procedures. Particularly in times of budget-
ary restraint, it is simply unrealistic to believe that public regulatory
agencies can adequately police professions or induce product manufac-
turers to ensure public safety.'52 A lawsuit against a physician would
149. Id. at 459.
150. As Justice Stevens stated in his Walters dissent, the Court has "necessarily assumed
that the individual's right to ask for, and to receive, legal advice from the lawyer of his choice
was fully protected by the First Amendment." 105 S. Ct. at 3214 n. 16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. See Munson, 104 S. Ct. at 2852-53 ("That the statute in some of its applications actu-
ally prevents the misdirection of funds from the organization's purported charitable goal is
little more than fortuitous.").
152. See Select Committee Hearings (Nov. 8, 1974), supra note 8, at 21. As pointed out in
the MICRA hearings, for example, one doctor who was accused of performing hundreds of
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have a deterrent effect similar to a public agency investigation of a pa-
tient's complaint against a doctor. Punitive damage awards in product
liability lawsuits, for example, perform an important public function by
causing manufacturers to design and promote safer products and to re-
move from the market dangerously unsafe products.
15 3
The type or amount of compensation the attorney receives should
not affect the client's right to bring such lawsuits, nor prevent these suits
from being afforded a higher level of protection than ordinary commer-
cial speech under the first amendment. Laws such as section 6146 which
restrict the amount a client may pay his or her attorney, and which may
ultimately inhibit a client's right to sue, therefore, should be strictly
scrutinized.
4. The Roa majority's circumvention of the first amendment
Although the Roa majority acknowledged what it called the dis-
sent's "creative" first amendment argument, it relegated its discussion to
a footnote and raised three criticisms which it contended prevented the
application of such constitutional protection to the California statute.
15 4
The logical extension of the dissent's argument, the court asserted, would
preclude a state from imposing any limitation on attorney fees, no matter
how unreasonable those fees may be. The court also argued that regula-
tion of the use of contingency fees in connection with the pursuit of first
amendment activities historically has been permitted. Finally, it con-
tended that the record in the case provided no factual basis to support a
claim that section 6146 prevents the free exercise of medical malpractice
unnecessary surgeries remained undetected by licensing authorities until a multimillion dollar
lawsuit by his patients brought him to public attention. Select Committee Hearings (Dec. 20,
1973), supra note 8, at 23, 27-32, 41-42.
Despite the fact that medical malpractice victims have been alleged to number from
136,000 to 310,000, a recent report by Ralph Nader revealed that only 563 cases of serious
disciplinary action against doctors occurred nationwide in 1983. Parachini, Study Questions
Emphasis in Medical Malpractice, L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1985, § V (View), at 1, col. 5. The
same report also concluded that the states most affected by the insurance crisis also recorded
the lowest rates of physician discipline. The implication raised by this correlation is that "pre-
miums may be driven up not by greed by lawyers and patients or defects in the court system
but because medical boards are still failing to detect and put out of business doctors whose
ineptitude hikes rates for all physicians." Id. at 1, col. 5 to 18, col. 1.
153. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 383
(1981). "Punitive damages... remain as the most effective remedy for consumer protection
against defectively designed mass produced articles. They provide a motive for private individ-
uals to enforce rules of law and enable them to recoup the expenses of doing so which can be
considerable and not otherwise recoverable." Id.
154. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 927 n.5, 695 P.2d at 167 n.5, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80 n.5.
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plaintiffs' first amendment rights.155 None of these arguments, however,
dispel the notion that first amendment rights are infringed by attorney
fee limits or, correspondingly, that a strict level of scrutiny should be
applied to such regulations.
The Roa majority's conclusion that every regulation of attorney fees
would run afoul of the first amendment is unsupported by the court's
reasoning. While many existing fee regulations would probably not sur-
vive such an analysis, the outcome in all cases is by no means certain.
For example, a New York court rule established in the 1950's which
regulates contingency fees in all personal injury litigation might pass con-
stitutional muster even under a strict scrutiny test. The rule was adopted
after reports exposed that more than sixty percent of the contingency fee
agreements in one judicial department provided a fee of more than fifty
percent to the lawyer. 56 Although the New York rule reduces the attor-
ney's recovery depending on the size of the verdict, it also provides that
application for greater compensation can be made to the court if the par-
ties establish that a higher fee under certain circumstances is war-
ranted.' 57 Under a first amendment analysis, this rule might be upheld if
the government's need to control the well documented fee abuses out-
weighs the rule's high degree of intrusion into the litigant's decision mak-
ing process.
However, although the impact of the New York rule may be less
severe than the California statute because it permits some variation from
the limitations, it may still violate the first amendment because it pre-
vents a fully informed plaintiff from consenting to payment of a higher
fee without court approval. Laws which permit such a knowing and
informed consent would probably survive a first amendment analysis be-
cause they would not infringe upon the client's decision. In addition,
regulations which adopt a reasonableness standard, in contrast to strict
limits, might also be acceptable, particularly if the factors for determin-
ing the fee include the availability of counsel and the difficulty of the
case. 1
58
The majority's second argument, that regulation of contingency fees
in connection with the exercise of first amendment rights has historically
been permitted, contradicts its conclusion that contingency fees are not a
155. Id.
156. N.Y. Cr. R. § 603.7(e) (McKinney 1984).
157. See Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43, modified, 161 N.E.2d 736 (1959), ap-
peal dismissed, 361 U.S. 374 (1960).
158. See supra note 20 for list of medical malpractice statutes with such ameliorating
factors.
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form of speech protected by the first amendment. The majority supports
its reasoning by drawing an analogy between section 6146 and a Califor-
nia statute that completely prohibits the acceptance of contingency fees
by legislative lobbyists, including attorneys, in connection with the pas-
sage or defeat of legislation.1 9 However, while first amendment rights
are implicated by this prohibition, the purpose of a contingent fee for
legislative action is fundamentally different from the use of such fees in
connection with litigation. Lobbyists are not generally attempting to ob-
tain a monetary recovery for their clients, but are seeking to influence the
passage or defeat of legislation. 1" Moreover, contingent fees have been
allowed in "quasi-judicial" legislative or administrative actions where the
aim of the employment is to persuade such bodies to pay tort obliga-
tions. 161 Further, unlike litigants, persons employing lobbyists for polit-
ical or legislative advocacy are not dependent upon the success of the
lobbyists' efforts to pay their representative's fees. Although contingent
fees are banned by the statute,* the amount a lobbyist can be paid is not
itself subject to regulation. The ban on contingent fees in legislative ac-
tions also does not selectively burden any particular group in the political
process, but applies equally across the board to all viewpoints, while sec-
tion 6146 only burdens medical malpractice plaintiffs. 162
The plaintiffs' lack of factual support for their claims provided the
final basis for the Roa majority's rejection of their first amendment
claims.' 63 But this reasoning again is faulty. When challenging statutes
that affect the exercise of first amendment rights, there is no requirement
that litigants present factual documentation; they must only show that
their claims are more than "merely theoretical.""' The Roa plaintiffs
raised more than theoretical claims that section 6146 inhibits the free
exercise of first amendment rights.
Evidence presented to the court establishes that medical malpractice
159. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 927 n.5, 695 P.2d at 167 n.5, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80 n.5 (citing CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 86205(0 (West 1976)). That section provides that "No lobbyist shall...
[a]ccept or agree to accept any payment in any way contingent upon the defeat, enactment or
outcome of any proposed legislative or administrative action." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 86205(f)
(West 1976).
160. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 937 n.6, 695 P.2d at 174-75 n.6, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 87-88 n.6 (Bird,
C.J., dissenting).
161. Hollister v. Ulvi, 199 Minn. 269, 271 N.W. 493 (1937). See also Comment, The Con-
tingent Fee. Disciplinary Rule, Ethical Consideration or Free Competition?, 1979 UTAH L.
REV. 547, 549.
162. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 937 n.6, 695 P.2d at 174 n.6, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 87 n.6 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
163. Id. at 927 n.5, 695 P.2d at 167 n.5, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80 n.5.
164. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam).
Dec. 1985]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:623
cases are extremely difficult to prove, require expensive expert witnesses,
demand a great deal of research and exhaust a tremendous amount of an
attorney's time.165 Further, the risk of zero recovery is higher than in
other tort cases. 166 Thus, the fact that the statute only limits medical
malpractice plaintiff fees, does not permit a higher fee in special circum-
stances and dramatically reduces an attorney's potential recovery, leads
to the conclusion that established and experienced attorneys will refuse
to handle medical malpractice cases. 167 By limiting only plaintiffs' attor-
ney fees, the statute permits defendants to spend unlimited amounts to
hire counsel to fight such cases while limiting the ability of plaintiffs to
obtain equally effective attorneys at premium rates. 168 Therefore, the
high probability that section 6146 interferes with the selection of counsel
by malpractice plaintiffs should have prompted the court to invalidate
the statute under a first amendment analysis despite the lack of empirical
evidence that large numbers of attorneys are refusing to handle such
cases.
5. Section 6146 does not serve a compelling purpose
Under a first amendment analysis, section 6146 would not survive a
strict scrutiny test for several reasons. Under such a test, the government
would be required to establish a compelling purpose for restriction of
contingency fees. 169 The express purpose of the legislature in enacting
165. Keene, supra note 3, at 29-30.
166. See AUDITOR GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 28 (50% of medical malpractice
cases are disposed of with no recovery); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N SPECIAL TASK FORCE
ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s: RE-
PORT 2, at 6 (Nov. 1984) (approximately three out of four claims against physicians closed
without payment) [hereinafter cited as AMA REPORT 2].
167. Declarations of several prominent plaintiff's attorneys substantiating this claim were
submitted to the California Supreme Court in the Roa plaintiff's petition for rehearing. Appel-
lants' Petition for Rehearing in the Supreme Court of the State of California, at app. A, Roa v.
Lodi Medical Group, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985) (declara-
tions of D. Harney, R. Ritter, R. Aldrich, J. Denove, S. Desimone & K. Davidson).
168. As one court has noted, "in the administration of justice a measure of equality in
ability of counsel representing the litigants is a great aid in arriving at a just solution of the
issues involved." Cline v. Warrenberg, 109 Colo. 497, 501, 126 P.2d 1030, 1031 (1942).
169. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 581-2 (1978):
[R]egulatory choices aimed at harms not caused by ideas or information as such are
acceptable so long as they do not unduly constrict the flow of information and ideas.
In such cases, the first amendment... requires a "thumb" on the scale to assure that
the balance struck... properly reflects the central position of free expression in the
constitutional scheme.
As described by Professor Tribe, this balancing test requires that a court conduct a weigh-
ing of the extent to which communicative activity is inhibited and, on the other hand, the
values, interests or rights served by enforcing the inhibition. Id. § 12-20, at 682-83. Two
factors must be considered in determining the level of justification required of the government:
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section 6146 was to control doctors' insurance premiums; the statute was
not formulated in response to any documented or widespread problem of
unreasonable attorney fees. 7 '
While reduction of insurance premiums may be a legitimate state
interest, contingency fee controls only marginally address this goal. Re-
cent factual evidence makes clear that attorney fee limits have not aided
in reducing health care costs or malpractice premiums, nor discouraged
the bringing of frivolous suits. The American Medical Association re-
cently conceded that "[t]he expected reduction in the number and sever-
ity of professional liability suits against physicians and hospitals never
happened," and that "limiting attorney fees may not reduce the number
or severity of suits."''
In addition, although the statute may have been designed to protect
malpractice victims from unreasonable fees, it actually causes some
plaintiffs to pay higher attorney fees. Prior to the enactment of section
6146, plaintiffs customarily paid a lower fee if their cases settled prior to
trial. The statute, however, makes no such distinction. As a result, a
plaintiff whose case settles without litigation may pay a higher fee under
section 6146.172
Finally, the state's paternalistic interest in protecting its citizens
does not justify an infringement on the exercise of their first amendment
rights. As Chief Justice Bird stated, "[i]t is entirely inappropriate for the
state to 'protect' an individual by suppressing his or her exercise of a
First Amendment right."' 73 Justice Stevens made a similar point in his
Walters dissent. He explained that "[i]t is rather misleading to imply
that a rejection of the Lochner holding is an endorsement of rational pa-
ternalism as a legitimate legislative goal."' 74
While fee controls prevent an attorney from charging more than the
(1) the degree to which any inhibition falls unevenly upon various groups (i.e. the poor); and
(2) the degree to which the inhibition operates to shut down places that have traditionally been
associated with the public exchange of ideas. Id. § 12-20, at 683-84. Where these two factors
are present, the government's burden of justification is at its highest. Id. Thus, because sec-
tion 6146 imposes a heavier burden on the poor and restricts access to a public forum, the
government has a particularly heavy burden of justification.
170. Although protection of plaintiffs from high fees was one of the stated purposes, it was
not the primary purpose of the statute. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
171. AMA REPORT 2, supra note 166, at 13, 18. Another study showed that "[l]imits on
contingent fees show some sign of reducing severity and total claim costs, but the significance
level is low." P. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS 31 (1983).
172. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 945, 695 P.2d at 181, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 941, 695 P.2d at 177, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 90 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
174. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180, 3214 (1985) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
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mandatory limits, they also prevent knowledgeable individuals from de-
ciding to pay a higher fee to advance their interests. 75 If the plaintiff is
prohibited from using money to choose the conduit by which his views
will be presented to the court, he is being denied meaningful access to
those courts. The cases relied upon by the majority do not in any way
address this concern. The sole realistic justification articulated by the
court, to protect claimants "from extortion or improvident bargains,"'' 76
is a rationale stemming from cases which were decided prior to any
United States Supreme Court consideration of a constitutional right to
petition the courts. 17 7 By relying on this line of reasoning, the majority
ignores the more recent principle that laws which actually affect the exer-
cise of first amendment freedoms cannot be sustained merely because
they deal with some evil within the state's legislative competence.
7 1
Thus, because the evils of unreasonable contingency fees are merely spec-
ulative and remote, statutes that prevent citizens from paying fees they
consider necessary to obtain desired representation would not withstand
first amendment scrutiny.
B. Due Process
1. The right to counsel in civil cases
Although the Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc. court refused to rec-
ognize the implication of a first amendment right in the application of
section 6146, it did acknowledge that plaintiffs have a constitutionally
protected due process right to counsel in civil cases. 17  But while both
175. Section 6147 of the California Business and Professions Code requires that all plaintiffs
be advised in advance of the statutory fee limits. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6147 (West
Supp. 1985). Section 6146 of that code provides that if a recovery is made, the plaintiff will
retain a specified percentage. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1985). However,
if as a result of the fee limits, a plaintiff must settle for an attorney less able to present his case,
then the chances of recovery might be reduced. Thus, a plaintiff may decide that a higher fee
would allow him to obtain a better lawyer and might bring with it a greater likelihood of
success. See also Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180, 3214
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he attorney fee limit purports to protect the veteran who
has little or no need for protection and it actually denies him assistance in cases in which the
help of his own lawyer may be of critical importance.").
176. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 926, 695 P.2d at 167, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (quoting Calhoun v.
Massie, 253 U.S. 170, 173-74 (1920)).
177. Id. at 939, 695 P.2d at 176, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 939 n.8, 695 P.2d at 176 n.8, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 89 n.8. As stated by the United
States Supreme Court in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978),
"[d]eference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights
are at stake." Id. at 843.
179. 37 Cal. 3d 920, 925-26, 695 P.2d 164, 166, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77, 79 (1983) (citing Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); Mendoza v. Small Claims Court, 49 Cal. 2d 668, 673,
321 P.2d 9, 12 (1958)).
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the majority and the dissent agreed that a rational basis test was the ap-
propriate standard of review, the opinions offer conflicting views of
whether the provisions of section 6146 were sufficiently related to proper
legislative objectives to avoid violating due process guarantees. 180 The
majority concluded that section 6146 did not "in any way" abrogate the
right to retain counsel.'81 In contrast, the dissent contended that section
6146 "significantly" interferes with that right and thus violates due pro-
cess because it is not "sufficiently" related to the purposes it was enacted
to achieve. 82 These contrary conclusions stem from selective oversight
of controlling authority or factual evidence in both opinions and a differ-
ing perspective of the limits of judicial review under the rational basis
test.
a. the Roa majority's rational basis test
The majority pointed to several state regulations and cases to sup-
port its premise that legislative ceilings on attorney fees are generally
valid and not subject to strict judicial scrutiny.'83 Yet, even in its appli-
cation of a rational basis test, the majority's critique falls far below the
minimum arguably necessary for the statute to pass constitutional muster
and instead, ignores glaring inconsistencies between the legislation's
goals and the means chosen to arrive at them. Further, the majority
made no attempt to reconcile differences in the various statutes it cited
with the provisions of section 6146. Nor did it articulate why the ration-
180. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall
be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
V. The fourteenth amendment provides that no state "shall... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Article I, § I of the California Constitution provides that: "All people are by nature free
and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, hap-
piness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
The Roa majority held that under due process guarantees, "legislative ceilings on attorney
fees are in no respect 'constitutionally suspect' or subject to 'strict' judicial scrutiny." 37 Cal.
3d at 927, 695 P.2d at 167, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80. While the court did not expressly articulate
the standard of review it was applying, in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital
it held that "[slo long as [a] measure is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, policy
determinations as to the need for, and desirability of, the enactment are for the Legislature."
36 Cal. 3d 359, 369, 683 P.2d 670, 676, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 677 (1984). According to the Roa
dissent, under a rational basis test, due process requires that legislation be "'reasonable and
proper,' not 'arbitrary and oppressive.'" 37 Cal. 3d at 942, 695 P.2d at 178, 211 Cal. Rptr. at
91 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
181. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 926, 695 P.2d at 166, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
182. Id. at 944, 695 P.2d at 180, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 93 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 927, 695 P.2d at 167, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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ale supporting those limits extended to the significantly more restrictive
provisions of section 6146. The majority also failed to explain why the
due process issues raised in Roa were resolved by the cases on which it
relied.
i. statutory comparisons
The majority improperly relied on statutes that differ markedly with
section 6146. For example, the New York and New Jersey contingency
fee scales each contain express authorization for judicial approval of a
higher fee in extraordinary circumstances. 184 Both also regulate fees in
all tort cases, not just medical malpractice actions, making personal in-
jury attorneys unable to avoid the restrictions by refusing to take certain
cases. The Nebraska medical malpractice attorney fee statute does not
specifically set any limit, but instead requires judicial approval of fees in
individual cases.185 Although the Delaware statute establishes a sliding
contingency fee scale similar to section 6146, it contains a provision per-
mitting the parties to agree on a mutually satisfactory per diem fee as an
alternative.'8 6 The more flexible approach taken by each of these regula-
tions may significantly ameliorate the potential difficulties faced by Cali-
fornia medical malpractice plaintiffs governed by the unwavering
limitations of section 6146.
The California statutes governing attorney fees in workers' compen-
sation and probate proceedings cited by the majority18 are also distin-
guishable. The workers' compensation statute, for example, does not
expressly set fee limits but instead permits reasonable attorney fees ac-
cording to guidelines established by a state board. 88 Injured plaintiffs
bringing such claims are not required to prove negligence, and the parties
184. Section 603.7(e)(4) of the New York Court Rules provides that: "In the event that...
plaintiff's attorney believes in good faith that [the fee schedule], because of extraordinary cir-
cumstances, will not give him adequate compensation, application for greater compensation
may be made [to the court]." N.Y. Cr. R. § 603.7(e)(4) (McKinney 1984). Rule 1:21-7(0 of
the New Jersey Court Rules provides that: "If at the conclusion of a matter an attorney
considers the fee permitted... to be inadequate, an application on written notice to the client
may be made to the [court] for hearing and determining of a reasonable fee in light of all the
circumstances." N.J. CT. R. Rule 1:21-7(0 (West 1984).
185. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2834 (1984).
186. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6865 (Supp. 1984).
187. 37 Cal. 3d at 926, 695 P.2d at 166, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
188. Contingency fees in workers' compensation cases, where the claimant's recovery is
statutorily limited, are not fixed by statute but must be reasonable. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4906
(West 1971). Fee guidelines are established by the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. A
fee of 9-12% of the permanent disability, death benefit or compromise and release awarded is
considered reasonable by the Board. 2 S. HERLICK, CALIFORNIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAW PRACTICE § 17.10, at 649 (3d ed. 1985).
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appear before an appeals board rather than a court. The cases are there-
fore less risky and more like the nonadversarial Veterans' Administration
claims system discussed in Walters v. National Association of Radiation
Survivors.'89 Probate attorneys are compensated according to the
amount of work performed and may receive additional fees for extraordi-
nary services. 190 Attorneys will earn a fee unless they perform no work
on behalf of an estate. And again, probate courts perform primarily pro-
cedural duties regarding the administration of estates, unlike the courts
that oversee civil litigation. Fee restrictions are therefore unlikely to dis-
courage attorneys from accepting either type of case since the risk of zero
recovery by the attorney is very small. 191
Although certain federal restrictions do impose fixed contingent fee
limits in cases against the government, the purpose of those controls dif-
fers from other statutory fee limits. Under the historical doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity, such claims may only be brought in limited
circumstances, subject to congressional approval and control.
192
ii. misplaced reliance on early twentieth century precedent
Several early twentieth century cases upholding the validity of attor-
ney fee limits in pension actions brought by war veterans and their fami-
lies were heavily relied on by the Roa majority. 193  The facts and
holdings of these cases, however, are inconsistent with the due process
claims raised by the Roas. Each case involved attempts by attorneys to
obtain higher fees from their former clients. The due process claims were
raised not by the clients, but by the attorneys, who argued that the fee
limits prevented them from obtaining higher fees which their clients had
previously agreed to pay. None of the cases involved a client's claim that
the fee restrictions violated their due process right to retain an attorney.
189. 105 S. Ct. 3180 (1985). See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
190. Attorney fees for conducting ordinary probate proceedings must be set at a fixed per-
centage according to the size of the estate with further amounts as the court may deem reason-
able for extraordinary services. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 910-911 (West 1981). Such fees may not
be a percentage of the value of assets recovered for the estate. In re McDonald's Estate, 37
Cal. App. 2d 521, 99 P.2d 1115 (1940). California courts have held that probate attorney fee
schedules do not violate due process guarantees because "[p]resumably, the public's interest is
served where those bereaved are insulated from negotiating over a lawyer's fee during the
traumatic postdeath period." Estate of Effron, 117 Cal. App. 3d 915, 925-26, 173 Cal. Rptr.
93, 99 (1981).
191. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 942, 695 P.2d at 178-79, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 91-92 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
192. See Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U.S. 170, 173 (1920).
193. 37 Cal. 3d at 926-27, 695 P.2d at 167, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (citing Yeiser v. Dysart, 267
U.S. 540 (1925); Margolin v. United States, 269 U.S. 93 (1925); Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U.S.
170 (1920); Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160 (1895)).
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For example, in Frisbie v. United States, 194 an attorney challenged a
congressional act prohibiting payment of more than ten dollars to attor-
neys presenting claims for government pensions. The attorney was in-
dicted for a violation of the act after apparently receiving a higher fee for
handling the claim of a soldier's widow. The Court rejected the attor-
ney's contention that the act unconstitutionally violated his due process
and contract rights. 195 Similarly, in Calhoun v. Massie,196 an attorney
attempted to recoup a fifty percent fee from a client after successfully
obtaining a recovery from the government. The attorney and client had
signed a contingency fee agreement for fifty percent; Congress approved
full payment of the claim but limited the attorney fee to twenty percent.
The Supreme Court rejected the attorney's claim that the restriction de-
nied him property without due process.
1 97
Legislative documentation supporting these early regulations reveals
the Roa court's misplaced reliance on these decisions. For example, the
Supreme Court's decision in Hines v. Lowrey, 198 discussed the substantive
evils that Congress sought to prevent during the early twentieth century
when it regulated attorney fees. In 1919, the Secretary of the Treasury
who was responsible for overseeing the Veteran's Benefit Program testi-
fied that:
Unscrupulous attorneys and claims agents are circularizing
prospective claimants ... [and] [i]n some instances their break-
neck rush for employment has led them to the length of cruci-
fying the wives and mothers of those in the service by false an-
nouncements that their husbands or sons have already
fallen ... 199
New York enacted the first contingency fee scale in response to similarly
well documented abuses by lawyers in that state. In upholding the rule,
the court noted that more than sixty percent of the 150,000 contingent
fee agreements filed with the courts each year provided for an attorney
fee of fifty percent or more.2"
These cases illustrate the dramatic abuses that legislatures and
courts have attempted to address in the past. In contrast, the lack of
such evidence has prompted other courts to reject fee controls. The Flor-
194. 157 U.S. 160 (1895).
195. Id. at 165-66.
196. 253 U.S. 170 (1920).
197. Id. at 172-73.
198. 305 U.S. 85 (1938).
199. Id. at 88 n.5 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 471, 65th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1918)).
200. Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 102, 160 N.E.2d 43, 52 (1959), modified, 6 N.Y.2d 983, 161
N.E.2d 736, appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 374 (1960).
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ida Supreme Court refused to adopt a contingency fee scale in tort cases
because a need for imposing such limits was not demonstrated. 20 1 While
recognizing that a small segment of the legal profession did engage in
overreaching and abuse, the court reasoned that a fee scale would not
prevent such abuses and that strict enforcement of existing rules and
standards would be a more effective means of dealing with "miscreant"
members of the profession.22
iii. unwarranted acceptance of legislative factual determinations
Lack of factual support also undermines the majority's contention
that section 6146 addresses the legislative goal of reducing malpractice
insurance premiums by encouraging smaller settlements and preventing
frivolous suits. Settlements would be lower, according to this rationale,
because plaintiffs could get the same net recovery by paying lower attor-
ney fees. 20 3 This assumes of course that a plaintiff's settlement demand
is inflated to take into consideration the net return after deduction of
costs and attorney fees. While economically this reasoning makes sense,
it ignores the realities of the imperfect world in which settlements are
reached. If taken to its logical extreme, this rationale would conclude
that limiting an attorney fee to one dollar would dramatically reduce
litigation costs and settlement expenses, and enable the client to retain
the maximum share of any recovery. In a perfect world, victims would
not need to spend any money at all for an attorney in order to obtain
compensation for their injuries. But, for many malpractice victims, the
opportunity to obtain any settlement comes only with the selection of
capable attorneys who have successfully prosecuted medical malpractice
cases and earned a reputation commanding respect from the defense.
Without such representation, plaintiffs would never be in a position to
begin negotiating a settlement, let alone to obtain adequate compensation
for their injuries. By inhibiting access to reputable attorneys, costs to
defendants and their insurers might be reduced, but at what price?
Further, most malpractice cases are settled for less than $100,000,
and within this range section 6146 does not dramatically reduce the con-
tingency fee percentage.2 ' Thus, while the fee limits will have a greater
201. In re Florida Bar, 349 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1977) (per curiam). The fee scale was proposed
by the state bar as an amendment to the state's disciplinary rules and was challenged as uncon-
stitutional by the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers. Id. at 631. Such amendments are within
the jurisdiction of the state's supreme court. Id. at 630.
202. Id. at 635.
203. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 931, 695 P.2d at 170, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
204. The average paid loss by physician owned malpractice insurance companies in 1983
was $72,243. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL LIABIL-
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impact on large settlements, and correspondingly will make it more diffi-
cult for severely injured victims to obtain attorneys, attorney fee savings
from smaller settlements will have little impact on the overall settlement
payouts by insurers.2 °5
Second, the court infers from the high number of defense verdicts in
medical malpractice cases that a particularly burdensome number of
such suits are frivolous and generate unnecessary legal expenses for doc-
tors and their insurers. 2 6 Again, the facts contradict this conclusion.
Studies show that the higher risk of loss in medical malpractice cases
forces attorneys to be more selective in choosing potential cases.20 7
Moreover, discouragement of frivolous suits by prejudging the likelihood
of meritorious claims is an arbitrary and improper exercise of legislative
power.2 °8 As the United States Supreme Court recently stated in
Zauderer v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 20 9 although discouragement of frivo-
lous suits may be a legitimate state interest, "[a] state is not entitled to
prejudge the merits of its citizens' claims. '210 The Court rejected the ar-
gument that a state has a right to prohibit certain types of lawyer adver-
tisements because of its desire to prevent lawyers from stirring up
litigation. "[W]e cannot endorse the proposition," the Court stated,
"that a lawsuit, as such, is an evil."'211 While some citizens may file law-
suits which ultimately are found to be meritless, states may only impose
sanctions after the fact and may not attempt to prevent any litigant from
bringing a potentially valid claim.212
Several other inconsistencies in section 6146 result in the failure of
ITY AND INSURANCE, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s: REPORT 1, at 17 (Oct. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as AMA REPORT 1]. Attorney fees for settlements under $100,000 pursuant
to § 6146 are 40% of the first $50,000 and 33% of the next $50,000. See supra note 1. Fee
agreements for settlements without trial in other fields of personal injury litigation, absent
statutory limits, are commonly between 30-40%.
205. The million dollar awards commonly reported by various sources are for jury verdicts,
not settlements. See Middleton, The Medical Malpractice War, Nat'l Law J., Aug. 27, 1984, at
9, col. 1 (chart of verdicts from 1973-83). Statistics breaking down settlement values by range
of payout are generally not provided by insurers.
206. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 932, 695 P.2d at 170-71, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83-84. Typically, only
one out of every three medical malpractice cases taken to trial concludes with a judgment for
the plaintiff. AUDITOR GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 3, at 28. In 1983, only 32% of the
verdicts reached in medical malpractice cases were in favor of the plaintiffs. AMA REPORT 1,
supra note 204, at 21.
207. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 947, 695 P.2d at 182, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 95 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
See also supra note 16.
208. 37 Cal. 3d at 947, 695 P.2d at 182, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 95 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
209. 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
210. Id. at 2279 n.12 (emphasis added).
211. Id. at 2278.
212. Id. at 2279 n.12.
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the statute to further the legislative goals of either reducing insurance
premiums or protecting plaintiffs. For instance, defense attorney fees
were pointedly left unregulated by the statute. But because such fees are
paid directly by malpractice insurers, defense fee limits would have a far
greater potential for reducing premiums.213 Fee limits also could have
been considered as a means of ensuring greater compensation for plain-
tiffs and preventing windfalls to attorneys who represent severely injured
victims. But the legislature did not provide any means of ensuring that
plaintiffs could obtain adequate legal services at the rates specified or that
they would actually retain a higher percentage of their recoveries.214
b. The Roa dissent-is lack of empirical evidence insurmountable?
The fundamental difficulty with the dissent's reasoning-and the
Roas' due process claims in general-is the lack of empirical support for
the contention that the contingency fee limits actually deprive medical
malpractice victims of the ability to obtain counsel. Some state courts
have accepted the hypothesis that contingency fee limits, particularly
those comparable to section 6146, will invariably have such an adverse
effect. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, for example, reasoned that
a contingency fee scale "inevitably will make such cases less attractive to
the plaintiff bar," and consequently will "at least somewhat deter the
litigation of legitimate causes of action." ' 5 The Roa court refused to
reach the same conclusion despite being presented with a similar set of
facts, reasoning instead that without an empirical showing that the limits
actually prevent plaintiffs from obtaining counsel, it could not strike
down the statute.21 6 Because the fee levels appeared to the majority to be
"quite generous," it concluded that "[u]nder the circumstances, we...
cannot hold that the amount of fees permitted renders the statute uncon-
213. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 951, 695 P.2d at 185, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 98 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 952, 695 P.2d at 185, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 98 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
215. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980). In holding the New Hamp-
shire statute unconstitutional, the court concluded that because of the importance of the af-
fected rights, the legislature could not deprive victims of those rights without a greater
showing that the regulation fit more closely with the goals of the medical malpractice act. Id.
at 945, 424 A.2d at 839.
216. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 927-28, 695 P.2d at 168, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81. The majority rejected
the plaintiffs' claims that the fee levels were so low that medical malpractice victims are unable
to retain attorneys: "The adequacy of the fees permitted by the statute is in large measure an
empirical matter, and plaintiffs have made no showing to support their factual claim." Id. at
928, 695 P.2d at 168, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81. The court also dismissed the argument that because
§ 6146 only regulates medical malpractice attorney fees, it would drive the most competent
attorneys out of the field. "Once again," the court stated, "plaintiffs have failed to make any
showing to support the factual premise of their contention." Id. at 930, 695 P.2d at 169, 211
Cal. Rptr. at 82.
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stitutional on its face." 2 17
The Roa plaintiffs claimed, however, that just because the victims of
section 6146 may not be individually identifiable and can be known to
exist only as a statistical group, the courts may not disregard the poten-
tial for denial of access or destruction of their claims.218 The Roas analo-
gized this statistical probability to the hypothetical due process claims
raised by prospective nuclear accident victims in Duke Power Co. v. Caro-
lina Environmental Study Group.2 19 In Duke Power, the plaintiffs chal-
lenged a federal statute which limited the potential recovery of damages
by victims of nuclear accidents. 220 Because no such accident had yet oc-
curred, the real impact of the Act could not be determined. However,
the Court did not feel restrained by this circumstance and proceeded to
evaluate the hypothetical due process claims. The probability that some
medical malpractice victims will be unable to obtain attorneys as a result
of the fee limits requires a similarly serious inquiry into the legislative
purpose and effect of the statute.
The Roa court's factual conclusion that section 6146 does not de-
prive injured medical malpractice victims of the opportunity to obtain an
attorney leaves the decision vulnerable to attack. The majority opinion's
language suggests that the court might reevaluate its position if presented
with factual evidence that malpractice victims are unable to obtain repre-
217. Id. at 928, 695 P.2d at 168-69, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81 (emphasis added). In addition to
pointing out the perceived factual weaknesses in the plaintiff's case, the court went further and
offered its own determination of the adequacy of the statute's fee levels. The court conducted a
comparison of other statutory fee provisions and concluded that "section 6146's limits are in
fact quite generous." Id. at 928, 695 P.2d at 168, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81 (citing Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1982) (limits fees in claims against government to 25% after
court action or 20% prior to court action); Veterans' Benefit Act, 38 U.S.C. § 3404 (1982)
(limits fees for handling claims to $10); Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (1982) (lim-
its fees for handling claims for benefits to 25%); N.J. CT. R. Rule 1.21-7 (West 1984) (estab-
lishing a sliding contingency fee scale)). The majority suggested that under each provision, the
Roas' attorney fees would have been lower. However, other than the veterans' provision, only
the original New Jersey schedule would have provided a lower fee. In fact, under its newly
increased limits, the New Jersey rule would have permitted an additional $50,000 in fees for
the Roas' attorneys. See supra note 22. The Roa majority subsequently modified its opinion to
reflect the higher New Jersey limits, although it continued to assert the view that the Califor-
nia fee limits were not unreasonable in comparison. 38 Cal. 3d 620a (1985) (see supra note 6
for explanation of modification). The other federal statutes would have permitted fees of more
than $100,000 in the Roa case. 37 Cal. 3d at 943 n.10, 695 P.2d at 179 n.10, 211 Cal. Rptr. at
92 n.10 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
218. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement to the United States Supreme Court at 21, Roa v.
Lodi Medical Group, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985).
219. 438 U.S. 59 (1968) (upholding Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982) eliminat-
ing causes of action of nuclear accident victims for damages in excess of $560 million over due
process denial of property claims).
220. Id. at 67-68.
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sentation. A potential plaintiff that could document such a result might
succeed where the Roas failed.
Other courts, particularly in the medical malpractice arena, have
struck down statutes on due process grounds that were initially upheld as
constitutional. For example, in Aldana v. Holub,z21 the Florida Supreme
Court reversed an earlier decision upholding the state's medical malprac-
tice act when presented with factual evidence that the provisions were in
effect, depriving malpractice plaintiffs of access to the courts. 22 2 Simi-
larly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down that state's Health
Care Services Malpractice Act on due process grounds in Mattos v.
Thompson,"23 despite its previous decision that the statute complied with
the basic elements of due process.22 4
If the California Supreme Court is presented with empirical evi-
dence that the fee limits are so low they actually deprive medical mal-
practice victims of counsel, it might determine that section 6146 is
unreasonable, constituting a denial of due process. 2 25 Because the Roas'
appeal was primarily a facial attack on the statute, the door has been left
open for an appropriately aggrieved party to raise a due process chal-
lenge to section 6146 as applied.
2. Procedural due process and access to the courts
Whether limitations on the right of access to the courts affront sepa-
rate first amendment and due process rights poses a difficult conceptual
problem. In the framework of statutory attorney fee limits, the problem
can best be approached by viewing the two interests affected as independ-
ent, though intertwined. First, as previously discussed, litigants have a
first amendment right to select a spokesperson to advocate their interests
in court, whether those interests are political, social or economic. Sec-
221. 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
222. In Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), the Florida Supreme Court upheld
a statute requiring submission of medical malpractice claims to mediation panels over objec-
tions that the provisions deprived plaintiffs of access to the courts. Four years later, inAldana,
the court declared that the medical mediation act was unconstitutional because "the act in its
operation has proven arbitrary and capricious." 381 So. 2d at 235.
223. 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
224. In Parker v. Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 128-30, 394 A.2d 932,
943-44 (1978), the court upheld the Act's arbitration system. However, the Mattos court,
upon review of the empirical evidence, concluded that "the lengthy delay occasioned by the
arbitration system ... does in fact burden the right of a jury trial ... [making] the right
practically unavailable." 491 Pa. at 391, 421 A.2d at 195.
225. As stated by the Colorado Supreme Court, "[t]o arbitrarily deny a claimant the right
of competent legal representation, by fixing unreasonably low remuneration for services ren-
dered by attorneys, is a serious matter, and may amount to a denial of due process." Cline v.
Warrenberg, 109 Colo. 497, 500, 126 P.2d 1030, 1031 (1942).
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ond, if fee limitations prevent a litigant from presenting a claim in the
civil judicial system, then procedural due process issues arise. The focus
of this inquiry is whether adequate alternatives for resolution of the liti-
gant's grievance are available and whether a state must permit un-
hampered access to its courts regardless of the nature of the controversy
or right being asserted.
On two occasions, the United States Supreme Court has addressed
the question of a civil litigant's right of access to the courts. In both
cases the Court considered the type of controversy the potential litigant
sought to resolve, the nature of the limitation and the extent of available
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. In Boddie v. Connecticut,
226
welfare recipients seeking a divorce challenged the state's mandatory
court filing fees and costs, contending that they were denied access to the
courts because of their inability to pay the fees. Remarking that it had
"seldom been asked to view access to the courts as an element of due
process," the Supreme Court determined that the lack of any alternative
to the state's judicial machinery for dissolution of marriage mandated
free access under the due process clause, despite legitimate state interests
in preventing frivolous litigation and controlling the allocation of re-
sources. 227 According to the Court, due process requires that, "absent a
countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to
settle their claims through the judicial process must be given a meaning-
ful opportunity to be heard.
228
In its next opportunity to address the judicial access question, the
Court refused to extend the Boddie holding beyond divorce proceedings.
In United States v. Kras,229 the sharply divided members of the Court
rejected, by a five to four vote, a debtor's due process challenge to bank-
ruptcy filing fees. Distinguishing Boddie, the majority reasoned that in
contrast to divorce, bankruptcy is not the only method available to a
226. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
227. Id. at 375-77. The Court reasoned that due process protections are traditionally
viewed as safeguards for a defendant because at the point when the plaintiff invokes the power
of a court, the judicial proceeding is "the only effective means of resolving the dispute at hand
and denial of a defendant's full access to that process raises grave problems for its legitimacy."
Id. at 376.
228. Id. at 377. The Court, however, limited its holding to divorce cases, stating:
We do not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a right that is, in all
circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
so that its exercise may not be placed beyond the reach of any individual, for... in
the case before us this right is the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a fun-
damental human relationship. The requirement that these appellants resort to the
judicial process is entirely a state-created matter.
Id. at 382-83.
229. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
CONTINGENCY FEE LIMITS
debtor for adjustment of his legal relationship with his creditors. "How-
ever unrealistic the remedy may be in a particular situation, a debtor, in
theory, and often in actuality, may adjust his debts by negotiated agree-
ment with his creditors."23 Thus, the government's role with respect to
a private commercial relationship, the Court stated, is "qualitatively and
quantitatively different from its role in the establishment, enforcement,
and dissolution of marriage. ' 231 Moreover, the Court reasoned, he right
to obtain a divorce is protected by the first amendment freedom of associ-
ation guarantees, while protection of the debtor is merely a legislatively
created benefit.232 Therefore, the Court concluded, a rational justifica-
tion for imposing certain limits on the use of the bankruptcy system was
sufficient to avoid due process concerns.233
In dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the role of the courts in
Boddie and Kras could not be distinguished. "What is involved is the
importance of access to the courts, either to remove an obligation that
other branches of the government stand ready to enforce,.., or to deter-
mine claims of right ... 234 When a person raises a claim of right or
entitlement under the laws, the only forum in our legal system empow-
ered to determine that claim, according to Justice Marshall, is a court.235
Although a tort victim's common law right to sue for damages is not
constitutionally guaranteed,236 contingent fee controls restrict access to
the courts for determination of that person's rights. Private settlements
of such disputes may in fact be possible without litigation. However,
unlike bankruptcy protection, the right to prosecute civil damage claims
and resort to civil courts for arbitration of such disputes has been histori-
230. Id. at 445.
231. Id. at 445-46.
232. Id. at 444-45.
233. Id. at 446-47. Development of discharge in bankruptcy, according to the Court,
"'represents an independent.., public policy in favor of extricating an insolvent debtor from
what would otherwise be a financial impasse."' Id. at 447 (quoting J. MACLACHLAN, BANK-
RUPTCY 88 (1956)). "[T]his obviously is a legislatively created benefit, not a constitutional
one.... [and] [t]he mere fact that Congress has delegated to the... Court[s] supervision over
the proceedings... does not convert a statutory benefit into a constitutional right of access to a
court." Id. at 447.
234. Id. at 462 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 462 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "The legal system is, of course, not so pervasive
as to preclude private resolution of disputes. But private settlements do not determine the
validity of claims of right." Id. at 463 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
236. See Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929) ("[T]he Constitution does not forbid the
creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by common law, to attain a
permissible legislative object."); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59,
88 n.32 (1978) (" 'A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law.
[citations omitted] .... Indeed, statutes limiting liability are relatively commonplace and have
consistently been enforced by the courts.' ").
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cally recognized.2 37 Further, neither Kras nor Boddie considered a sepa-
rate first amendment right of access to the courts. Under a first
amendment analysis, that right could only be limited for a compelling
purpose.
3. Substantive due process-the right to contract
One issue not directly addressed by either the majority or dissent in
Roa concerns whether attorney fee limits infringe upon the constitution-
ally protected freedom to contract. The right to contract is an element of
personal liberty protected by both state and federal due process clauses2 38
and the contract clause of the Constitution.2 39 The due process clauses
protect the liberty and formation elements of a contract, while the con-
tract clause secures the interests and expectations created by private con-
tracts.2' Early legislation setting wages or limiting work ,hours was
generally held invalid as a violation of an employee's right to contract
under the federal due process clause. 24 But during the 1930's the courts
disavowed this substantive due process approach and generally upheld
wage and hour laws as permissible economic regulations, despite this in-
terference with the contract bargaining process.2 42
Although limitations on contracts for professional services also di-
rectly inhibit the contract bargaining process, such contracts are primar-
ily economic transactions. Therefore, regulations affecting these
agreements are generally reviewed with only a minimal level of judicial
scrutiny. 43 Under a rational basis analysis, statutes governing economic
transactions are generally presumed valid and rationally related to
proper legislative goals. 2 " Accordingly, those challenging such a regula-
tion bear the burden of proving that a statute is arbitrary in order to
establish a due process violation.245
237. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 375 ("It is to courts, or other quasi-judicial official bodies, that we
ultimately look for the implementation of a regularized, orderly process of dispute
settlement.").
238. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
239. Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution provides that no state shall pass any
"[l]aw impairing the Obligation of contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
240. Blum & Wellman, Participation, Assent and Liberty in Contract Formation, 1982 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 901, 905. See also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
241. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
242. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.'379 (1937).
243. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1979) ("The Due Process Clause imposes
only broad limits ... on the exercise by a State of its authority to regulate its economic life, and
particularly the conduct of the professions.").
244. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
245. Id.
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While modem courts have consistently rejected the historical sub-
stantive due process standard for judicial review of economic regulations,
the California Supreme Court has in some circumstances taken a some-
what more rigorous approach in the area of freedom of contract.2 46 For
example, it has held that legislation infringing on the right to contract
must be judged from its tendency to promote the welfare of the general
public rather than that of a small percentage of citizens. 247 Further, Cal-
ifornia courts have recognized that citizens have a constitutionally pro-
tected right to contract with the attorney of their choice.2 48  Because
section 6146 primarily benefits doctors by purportedly lowering their in-
surance premiums, the court would have had a legitimate basis for apply-
ing a higher level of review in the Roa case. Its reluctance to do so,
however, is not surprising.
In reviewing the constitutionality of sliding scale contingency fee
limits, some state and federal courts have discussed the right to contract
issue but have dealt inconsistently with the infringement of contractual
rights which results from such regulations. While a few courts have ap-
plied a traditional rational basis test, others have imposed a stricter level
of scrutiny where this issue has been raised. The results, depending on
the type of test used, have been mixed.
In American Trial Lawyers Association v. New Jersey Supreme
Court,249 the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted an appellate court
holding that a judicial rule restricting contingency fees did not unreason-
ably violate the constitutional right to freedom of contract.25 ° In uphold-
ing the regulation, the appellate court reasoned that attorneys were not
businessmen entitled to charge what the traffic would bear and had never
had the right to enforce contractual provisions for more than a fair and
reasonable amount.251 The judiciary, the court concluded, was therefore
free to set fee restrictions as part of its constitutional powers to regulate
the practice of law. 52 Under a traditional rational basis standard of re-
246. Blum & Wellman, supra note 240, at 909.
247. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 2d 481, 171 P.2d 21 (1946); De
Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 2d 225, 153 P.2d 983 (1944).
248. Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982);
Estate of Bodger, 128 Cal. App. 2d 710, 276 P.2d 83 (1954) (court of appeal invalidated trial
court order appointing certain attorney to represent beneficiaries on appeal, holding that order
was in excess of court's jurisdiction).
249. 126 N.J. Super. 577, 316 A.2d 19, afJd, 66 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d 350 (1974). The plain-
tiffs also brought a simultaneous federal action which was stayed pending the state court reso-
lution of the case. 409 U.S. 467 (1973).
250. 126 N.J. Super. at 591, 316 A.2d at 27, affid, 66 N.J. at 261, 350 A.2d at 352.
251. 126 N.J. Super. at 591, 316 A.2d at 27.
252. Id. at 587, 316 A.2d at 24.
Dec. 1985]
670 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:623
view, the court stated that its rules were presumptively valid, unless
proven arbitrary by the challenging party.25 3 Because the plaintiffs had
failed to make such a showing, the court concluded that the rule was a
reasonable and valid exercise of judicial power even though no empirical
basis of support existed for the fee limits.
25 4
The Florida Supreme Court reached the opposite result in In re
Florida Bar,2" a case involving the constitutionality of a sliding contin-
gency fee scale that the state bar association proposed for application in
all tort actions. Applying a strict level of scrutiny to the fee scale, the
court found that the limits posed the very real possibility of infringement
of the constitutional rights of its citizens to make contracts, and held that
absent-any demonstrable and overriding public policy, the limits were
unconstitutional. 5 6 While the court acknowledged that the freedom to
contract is subject to reasonable restraint in the interest of public welfare,
it reasoned that more effective means of controlling "miscreant" mem-
bers of the legal profession were available.257 Accordingly, because the
rule did not bear a substantial relation to its ostensible purpose, the court
held that the proposed regulation was an impermissible violation of indi-
vidual rights to contract for personal services.258
The New Hampshire Supreme Court also recognized that a contin-
gency fee scale established by its legislature in response to the medical
malpractice crisis unfairly burdened malpractice plaintiffs by interfering
with their freedom of contract.259 In Carson v. Maurer,2 ° the court con-
cluded that while the state's purpose was to contain insurance costs, the
contingency fee regulation was "questionably" related to that goal be-
cause it was unlikely to have a significant effect on the size of awards.26'
Therefore, the court found that the provision violated the constitutional
prohibition on interference with the right to contract.262
253. Id. at 590, 316 A.2d at 26.
254. Id. See also American Trial Lawyers, 66 N.J. at 266, 330 A.2d at 354 ("We... con-
cede... that the rule... was not bottomed on an evidentiary hearing, nor even on anything
approaching the lengthy investigation... [that revealed] the abuse of the contingent fee system
in New York."). Ironically, the New Jersey rule was adopted and reviewed by the very same
court. Although the court recognized that it was exercising a "legislative" function, id., no
independent review of the appropriateness of the rule occurred.
255. 349 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1977).
256. Id at 634-35. See also supra note 201.
257. Id. at 634 (citing Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914)).
258. Id. at 633-34.
259. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 945, 424 A.2d 825, 839 (1980). See also supra note
20.
260. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
261. Id. at 945, 424 A.2d at 839.
262. Id.
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These conflicting opinions cannot be reconciled on the grounds that
the rights or issues involved differed or that the factual settings were in
marked contrast. No empirical evidence was presented in any of the
cases concerning the impact of the fee controls, nor did any of the three
states impart a generally high level of contractual protection to other
professionals. Although the New Jersey decision reflects the more com-
mon approach to contractual issues, it is clear that that court was more
concerned with the challenge to its rule-making authority.263 In con-
trast, both the New Hampshire and Florida courts expressed concern
with the ultimate impact of the contractual limitations on the exercise of
other important rights.2 While these cases may not impart a new stan-
dard with respect to contract rights, they suggest that a minimal level of
scrutiny is inappropriate when regulations such as contingency fee limits
impact more than the simple economic result of a transaction.
C. Equal Protection
1. The court's rational basis debate
The equal protection issues in the MICRA cases involved legislative
classifications that primarily distinguished medical malpractice tort vic-
tims from all other tort victims. The attorney fee provision also results in
the imposition of heavier burdens on more severely injured malpractice
victims and provides special benefits for defense attorneys and medical
malpractice defendants.
The plaintiffs in all four MICRA cases alleged that as malpractice
victims they were arbitrarily singled out to bear particularly heavy bur-
dens as a result of ill-conceived and faulty legislative reasoning based on
factually unsupported claims of a supposed "crisis." They contended
that their exclusion from the political process and the importance of the
rights affected required a serious judicial inquiry to determine whether
the Act's provisions were substantially related to proper legislative goals.
Disagreement between members of the California Supreme Court
concerning the role of the court in adjudicating the constitutional claims
of individuals traditionally excluded from the legislative process surfaced
throughout the four MICRA decisions.265 Some members of the court
expressed a skeptical view of the legislative process and its ability to pro-
263. American Trial Lawyers, 126 N.J. Super. at 577, 316 A.2d at 19. The court primarily
discussed the challenge to its rule-making authority, id. at 583-90, 316 A.2d at 22-26, devoting
only a brief analysis to the plaintiffs' right to contract and equal protection claims. Id. at 591-
93, 316 A.2d at 27-28.
264. 349 So. 2d at 633.
265. See supra note 5.
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tect the disenfranchised, and appeared more willing to challenge the leg-
islative fact-finding process used to justify legislative enactments. Other
members of the court advocated a more traditional role throughout the
four cases, refusing to question the basis for legislative action absent the
existence of a well established suspect classification or fundamental right.
As the primary proponents of the more activist approach, Justices
Bird and Mosk viewed the court's role as that of an intervenor on behalf
of groups not adequately represented in the legislative process. Although
such groups may not form traditionally suspect classes, according to
these justices they share the common indicia of a lack of ability or re-
sources to approach and lobby the legislature. Because some individuals
are unable to organize a cohesive and effective presentation of their inter-
ests, their views are overpowered in the legislative arena by stronger,
more influential special interest groups. Legislative acts are potentially
skewed in favor of the more powerful and better represented, therefore
causing the factual premises upon which such acts are based to be unreli-
able. Where it appears that an affected group has been left out of the
legislative process, these justices would use the rational basis test to care-
fully review legislative acts rather than merely rubber stamp legislative
pronouncements.
An example of this approach can be seen in Chief Justice Bird's
dissent in the first medical malpractice case, American Bank & Trust Co.
v. Community Hospital.266 The Chief Justice observed that various inher-
ent characteristics of malpractice victims prevented them from ade-
quately advancing their interests in the political process. 26 7 Malpractice
victims may be physically or mentally disabled and are scattered or iso-
lated. Membership in the group is involuntary. At the time MICRA was
enacted, the individuals who were to make up the group were unaware of
the potential harm they were to suffer. They could not defend them-
selves and had no incentive to engage in coalition building or lobbying.268
In short, the group burdened was "one which legislators might single out
for discriminatory treatment with few, if any, political consequences.
'269
According to the Chief Justice, the purpose of the rational basis test
is to put a check on the power of the legislature in order to prevent impo-
sition of harmful burdens on such politically defenseless groups.270 The
size and vulnerability of the burdened group, as well as the extent of the
266. 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 397, 683 P.2d at 695, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 696 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 397-98, 683 P.2d at 695, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 696 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 399-400, 683 P.2d at 696-97, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 697-98 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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burden imposed, are essential to a determination of whether or not a
particular enactment raises constitutional concerns. Thus, under Chief
Justice Bird's view of the rational basis test, the court should have re-
viewed the facts supporting the enactment of MICRA to determine
whether a "crisis" existed which necessitated the imposition of severe
burdens on medical malpractice victims."7 1 In order to invalidate dis-
criminatory legislation under the more traditional rational basis test, the
Chief Justice argued, the court would have to conclude that the legisla-
ture acted "irrationally." This type of test, taken seriously, would make
the courts "lunacy commissions sitting in judgment on the mental capac-
ity of legislators." '
A majority of the members of the court rejected this approach and
remained deferential to legislative factual findings. They viewed their
role in applying a rational basis test as limited to a determination of
whether legislative findings support a proper legislative purpose. For ex-
ample, in American Bank the majority discussed the background of the
medical malpractice crisis but concluded that it was not the court's func-
tion to reweigh the facts to determine if a crisis existed. 73 Because the
legislature had determined that an insurance crisis had reduced the avail-
ability of medical care and that medical malpractice victims were faced
with the prospect of obtaining unenforceable judgments, 74 the American
Bank court concluded that the legislature had a legitimate interest in
enacting legislation to reduce malpractice insurance costs.27 5 The result-
ing statutes were valid under a rational basis test because the legislature
"could rationally have decided" that the statute promoted its
objectives.276
2. The rational basis test and the Supreme Court: a standard in flux
Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court which discuss
application of a heightened rational basis test or an intermediate level of
scrutiny also reflect confusion and inconsistency. In Plyler v. Doe,2 77 the
Court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny despite the absence of a
traditional suspect class or burdened fundamental right, because of con-
271. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 399, 683 P.2d at 696, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 697 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (quoting F.
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 819
(1935)).
273. Id. at 368-69, 683 P.2d at 675-76, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 676-77.
274. Id. at 371, 683 P.2d at 677-78, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 678-79.
275. Id. at 373, 683 P.2d at 679, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
276. Id. at 374, 683 P.2d at 679, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
277. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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cerns the Court considered "sufficiently absolute and enduring." '278 Ad-
dressing a Texas statute that prohibited free public education to children
of illegal aliens, the Court concluded that public education is not "merely
some governmental 'benefit,' "279 and reasoned that the statute unfairly
discriminated against children of the illegal aliens "on the basis of a legal
characteristic over which... [they] had no control. '280 As a result of
the dramatic and lasting impact such discrimination would have on the
children and the nation, the Court determined that the statute could not
be considered rational unless it furthered some "substantial" goal.
281
Under this heightened level of scrutiny, the Court questioned the pur-
poses of the statute and concluded that the state's interests were "wholly
insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these children, the State and
the Nation.
282
In dissent, Chief Justice Burger vigorously argued that the equal
protection clause does not preclude states from classifying persons on the
basis of factors and characteristics over which they have no control: "the
Equal Protection Clause . . . is not an all-encompassing 'equalizer'
designed to eradicate every distinction for which persons are not 'respon-
sible.' "283 Although the Chief Justice found the state's decision to deny
illegal alien children a free education personally repugnant, he stressed
that judicial use of the equal protection clause to remedy perceived fail-
ings of the political process would deprive those processes of the ability
to function.284
More recently, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,285 the
Court retreated from this use of intermediate equal protection scrutiny.
In Cleburne an organization seeking to establish a residence for mentally
retarded individuals was denied a zoning permit. The organization
claimed that the mentally retarded, by virtue of their immutable condi-
tion and lack of political power, were a "quasi-suspect" group deserving
278. Id. at 218 n.16. The Court acknowledged that undocumented aliens cannot be treated
as a suspect class because their presence in the country in violation of federal law is not a
"constitutional irrelevancy." Id. at 219 n.19. Furthermore, the Court added that education is
not a fundamental right which would require strict scrutiny. Id. at 226. Therefore, states need
not justify every variation in the manner in which education is provided by proving a compel-
ling necessity. Id. at 223.
279. Id. at 221.
280. Id. at 220. The Court stated that "legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups
disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of 'class or caste'
treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish." Id. at 216 n. 14.
281. Id. at 224.
282. Id. at 230.
283. Id. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 253 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
285. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
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of special consideration under the equal protection clause. The Court
concluded that although the mentally retarded were immutably different,
the state's interest in dealing with and providing for the mentally re-
tarded was plainly legitimate and relevant for the purposes of some forms
of discrimination.2" 6 Although the Court rejected the use of an interme-
diate level of scrutiny, it nevertheless struck down the ordinance on the
ground that the City's discrimination against the mentally retarded was
not relevant to any of the regulation's stated purposes.287
These decisions indicate that a heightened level of scrutiny would
not be applied by the Court to laws adversely affecting medical malprac-
tice victims despite the fact that they share many of the immutable char-
acteristics recognized in Plyler. However, the Cleburne Court did
conduct a serious inquiry into the legislative purpose of the challenged
ordinance. Under a similarly searching application of the Court's ra-
tional basis test, attorney fee limits that unequally burden medical mal-
practice victims might also be declared irrational. In particular, there is
no legitimate basis for regulating the attorney fees paid by medical mal-
practice victims. The attorney fee limits do not correspond to the legisla-
tive goal of reducing insurance premiums288 because fees paid by
plaintiffs do not generally affect the size of the verdict or the costs paid
by insurers.2" 9 Reductions in plaintiffs' attorney fees have not contrib-
uted to ending the so-called insurance crisis.2 9 However, unlike other
tort victims, malpractice plaintiffs' recoveries in California are substan-
tially limited. 91 Thus, the fee limits embodied in section 6146 may help
ensure that plaintiffs obtain adequate compensation. If this single justifi-
cation is sufficient under the Court's recent explanation of its rational
basis test, the equal protection clause would not stand as a barrier to laws
imposing these limits.
286. Id. at 3256.
287. Id. at 3260. The state asserted that the denial of the permit was necessary because of
objections by neighboring property owners and protection of the home's residents from stu-
dents at a nearby school or from possible floods because of the home's location in a flood plain.
Id. at 3259-60. The Court concluded that a home of similar size for nonmentally retarded
individuals would not have required a permit. This indicated that the ordinance was based on
an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded. Id at 3260.
288. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 13 & 204 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
291. Medical malpractice plaintiffs' recoveries are limited to $250,000 for non-economic
damages. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1985).
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3. State courts-conflicting levels of scrutiny applied
to contingency fee scales
Reflecting this lack of consensus, courts in other jurisdictions have
applied inconsistent equal protection analyses to contingency fee scales,
particularly in medical malpractice cases. In DiFilippo v. Beck,292 a
United States district court held that despite an unequal burden on plain-
tiffs, fee limits in medical malpractice cases were rational because they
would reduce malpractice insurance rates by deterring frivolous suits and
saving litigation expenses.293 Conversely, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court in Carson v. Maurer,294 found that state's malpractice attorney fee
provision violated equal protection guarantees because it improperly sin-
gled out victims of medical negligence for harsh treatment by restricting
the means by which they may sue. Although the court conceded that the
right to recover for injuries was not fundamental and that none of the
classifications created by the act required strict scrutiny, it concluded
that the rights involved were sufficiently important to require a more vig-
orous analysis than allowed under the rational basis test.295 Because the
attorney fee provision had no effect on the control of health care costs, its
relationship to the overall purpose of the malpractice act was "questiona-
ble" and therefore constituted a violation of equal protection
guarantees.296
One court that has evaluated a rule establishing contingency fee lim-
its in all tort cases on an equal protection basis rejected the application of
a strict or intermediate level of scrutiny. In American Trial Lawyers
Association v. New Jersey Supreme Court,297 the New Jersey Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the Appellate Department of the Superior
Court upholding such a regulation. The lower court held that the rule
did not unfairly discriminate against plaintiffs or their attorneys by ap-
plying only to contingent fees, by singling out contingent fees in negli-
gence cases or by excluding certain types of claims.298 Applying a
traditional rational basis test, the court found that separate treatment of
contingent fee agreements in tort actions was justified because of the
unique problems in attorney-client relationships and contingent fee
agreements.299
292. 520 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Del. 1981).
293. Id. at 1016.
294. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
295. Id. at 931-32, 424 A.2d at 830.
296. Id. at 945, 424 A.2d at 839.
297. 66 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d 350 (1974).
298. 126 N.J. Super. at 591-92, 316 A.2d at 27-28.
299. Id. at 592, 316 A.2d at 27.
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Although the Florida Supreme Court did not expressly consider
equal protection issues in In re Florida Bar,3" it refused to adopt a pro-
posed amendment to the state's Code of Professional Responsibility es-
tablishing limits on contingent fees in all tort cases because it was "not
disposed to elevate economic considerations above [the] right of access to
the courts."30 1 The court's balancing approach to these competing pol-
icy goals suggests that it would have applied at least an intermediate level
of review under an equal protection analysis.
These decisions reveal a lack of consensus by state courts concerning
the appropriate standards of review of regulations limiting contingency
fees. Although the statutes in question affect the same rights, some
courts have been willing to bestow a higher level of importance in order
to justify a more critical analysis of the legislative classifications. Others
have recognized that important rights are involved and that such regula-
tions impose discriminatory treatment on a small group, but have refused
to question legislative prerogatives in dealing with "crisis" situations.
4. Equal protection and MICRA-Has the Act
accomplished its goals?
The California Supreme Court could base a decision to strike down
MICRA and section 6146 on a separate rationale. The court was urged
in the medical malpractice cases to consider statistical information prov-
ing that the MICRA provisions had not reduced health care costs. Pro-
ponents of this approach argued that the court had, on many previous
occasions, reviewed events following the enactment of a statute when
considering a regulation's constitutional validity. Such a determination,
for example, led to the invalidation of the historically anomalous "guest
statutes" which prevented recovery by nonpaying automobile passengers
for injuries inflicted by a negligent driver.3"2
300. 349 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1977).
301. Id. at 633.
302. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973). The statute
may have been valid when first enacted as rationally related to the legitimate state interest of
protecting host drivers from the "ingratitude" of their passengers. However, the widespread
availability of automobile insurance in later years eliminated the justification for the distinction
between paying and non-paying passengers. Id. at 869, 506 P.2d at 221-22, 106 Cal. Rptr. at
398. Post-enactment information has also been considered by the California Supreme Court
and United States Supreme Court when ruling on other constitutional issues. See Home Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (validity of temporary restraint of enforcement
of contracts dependent upon inquiry of whether emergency still exists); Sonoma County Org.
of Pub. Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 311, 591 P.2d 1, 9, 152 Cal. Rptr.
903, 911 (1979) (en banc) (impairment of obligation of contracts invalid because an emergency
situation no longer existed).
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A majority of the court did not believe that this precedent com-
pelled them to consider the practical effect of the MICRA statutes. In
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital,3 3 for example, the
court held that the Act's constitutionality under the equal protection
clause did not depend on the court's assessment of MICRA's empirical
success or failure.3° However, the court contradicted this premise by
evaluating the Act in light of subsequent events. It insisted that MICRA
was principally designed to lower the cost of malpractice insurance and
offered evidence that insurance premiums had been reduced since the Act
took effect. 30 5 Moreover, because constitutional challenges to the legisla-
tion had prevented full implementation of the Act's provisions, the court
concluded that it could not fully determine the effectiveness of the
statute.306
In Barme v. Wood,3 ° 7 the second malpractice case, the court again
refused to review the effect of MICRA, despite criticism by Justice Mosk
that the passage of time had vindicated his conclusion that medical and
hospital costs had continued to rise in the years since the Act took ef-
fect.3 °8 In Roa, the court similarly refused to review the effectiveness of
the Act's attorney fee provision despite convincing evidence that the fee
limits had not contributed to a reduction in the costs borne by medical
malpractice defendants. 30 9 Given the strong precedent for such a review,
the court's refusal to consider this evidence was inappropriate. However,
the court may have left the door open for a challenge to the MICRA
statutes after final resolution of all of the constitutional issues and appli-
cation of the laws over a longer period of time.
5. Contingency fee restrictions as classifications based on wealth
Although the California Supreme Court has previously recognized
wealth as a suspect class, it refused to acknowledge in Roa that the attor-
ney fee provision unfairly burdened the poor. Yet, the statute appears to
fit squarely within the court's definition of this classification. In Serrano
v. Priest,310 the court stated that a careful examination of legislation "is
303. 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984).
304. Id. at 374, 683 P.2d at 679, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
305. Id. at 373, 683 P.2d at 679, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
306. Id
307. 37 Cal. 3d 174, 689 P.2d 446, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1984).
308. Id. at 182, 689 P.2d at 451, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 821 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
309. 37 Cal. 3d at 930, 695 P.2d at 170, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83. In a recent report by the
American Medical Association, the organization conceded that limiting attorney fees did not
reduce the number or severity of medical malpractice suits. See supra note 171 and accompa-
nying text.
310. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
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especially warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth... [a]
factor which would independently render a classification highly suspect
and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny."3 1 In Committee
to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers,31 2 the court expanded this ra-
tionale, claiming that:
[we have] been particularly critical of statutory mechanisms
that restrict the constitutional rights of the poor more severely
than those of the rest of society.... [The] indigent poor share
many characteristics of other "insular minorities" who may not
be adequately protected from discriminatory treatment by the
general safeguard of the legislative process.313
In addition, even though the United States Supreme Court has refused to
apply a heightened level of scrutiny to classifications based on wealth,
some members of that Court have urged this result.3" 4
The Roa majority ignored the plaintiffs' claim that section 6146 dis-
criminates on the basis of wealth, despite evidence that contingency fees
are the sole feasible method for many plaintiffs to finance protracted and
expensive malpractice litigation.3 5 According to Chief Justice Bird,
"only plaintiffs of modest means are truly unable to escape [the statutes]
restrictions. "316 In contrast, "affluent plaintiffs, as well as defendants,
can evade the limits by contracting for legal services on an hourly ba-
sis." '317 The absence of discussion on this issue thus makes the holding
questionable under California law.
D. Implications of Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc.
1. Are express waivers permissible?
The Roa court concluded that one of the legislative purposes of sec-
tion 6146 may have been to protect plaintiffs from unreasonable fees. 1
This holding may permit victims of medical malpractice to voluntarily
waive the statutory fee limits and pay a higher fee to obtain the attorney
of their choice.
Under section 3513 of the California Civil Code an individual may
311. Id at 597, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610 (quoting Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966)).
312. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
313. Id. at 281, 625 P.2d at 796, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
314. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 417I U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
315. 37 Cal. 3d at 949, 695 P.2d at 183, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
316. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
317. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
318. 37 Cal. 3d 920, 932, 695 P.2d 164, 171, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77, 84 (1985).
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waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit.319 However,
the statute also provides that "a law established for a public reason can-
not be controverted by a private agreement. 3 20 Usually, where statutes
do not grant individual benefits, but are grounded in public policy, at-
tempts to avoid them have been found invalid.3 21 The burden of deter-
mining whether a statute is for public or private benefit is placed upon
the court.322 Courts have used this discretion, for example, to permit
waivers of statutes of limitation which act to bar a remedy. Typically,
however, courts generally have not permitted waivers of substantive
rights such as minimum wage laws, unemployment insurance, worker's
compensation benefits and tenant rights.
3 23
In light of this rationale, section 6146 may permit waivers of the
proscribed fee limits. Although the Roa court suggested that one of
MICRA's goals was to lower medical malpractice insurance rates, sec-
tion 6146 has had an insignificant effect on that objective.324 However, as
the Roa court stated, the statute was also purportedly enacted to protect
injured parties by lowering their attorney fees. Thus, permitting a plain-
tiff's voluntary waiver of fee limits in order to contract for a higher fee
might be permissible under Civil Code section 3513.
Such a waiver could be compared with the case where the wife
waived her right to financial support for a more favorable community
property agreement.325 The client, like the wife, is losing a certain eco-
nomic benefit which the state has granted, but each in return is obtaining
a benefit more to his or her liking. The client realizes this benefit through
obtaining a better attorney who can offer greater certainty of recovery.
An even closer parallel is found in Maxwell v. Superior Court,326
where the California Supreme Court permitted a criminal defendant with
an eighth grade education to waive potential conflicts with his attorneys
in order to secure their representation in his criminal trial. Maxwell was
charged with four counts of robbery and ten counts of murder. He en-
tered into a retainer agreement with counsel whereby they were to repre-
sent him in return for publication rights to his life story.327 Despite
Maxwell's knowing and voluntary waiver of serious conflicts that jeop-
319. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3513 (West 1970).
320. Id.
321. 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Contracts § 498, at 426 (8th ed. 1973).
322. Id. § 494, at 422.
323. Id. § 498, at 426-27.
324. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
325. See Patton v. Patton, 32 Cal. 2d 520, 196 P.2d 909 (1948).
326. 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982).
327. Id. at 610, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
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ardized his right to effective representation and a fair trial,328 the trial
court recused the retained counsel, over Maxwell's objections, and ap-
pointed substitute counsel.329 The supreme court reversed, holding that
although Maxwell had a constitutional right to effective counsel and the
undivided loyalty of his attorneys, his right to obtain counsel of his
choice was more important. Thus, a client-may insist on retaining his
attorneys if he knowingly and intelligently waives potentially prejudicial
conflicts. 3 °
In civil matters, the right to chosen counsel must be weighed heavily
when considering conflicts of interest, professional ethics and judicial in-
tegrity.331 Disciplinary rules which attempt to protect clients from po-
tential conflicts with their attorneys are similar to fee restrictions that
attempt to protect clients from making a bad bargain. The waiver of a
statutory fee provision that otherwise inhibits a client's right to select an
attorney raises no more serious concerns than would a waiver of a con-
flict of interest that may result in a client being sentenced to death. Be-
cause the attorney fee would still be subject to the state and federal rules
prohibiting unconscionable fees, courts would be able to step in on an
individual basis to prevent such fees. In addition, where plaintiffs clearly
did not understand the ramifications of their decisions, courts could in-
validate an agreement and reimpose the statutory limits. It is highly un-
likely that most plaintiffs would voluntarily choose to pay a higher fee
when made aware of the statutory limits. However, voluntary waivers
would assist those plaintiffs who find it difficult or impossible to obtain
an attorney of their choice under the restrictive limits of section 6146.
Most fees would continue to fall within the prescribed limits and there-
fore accomplish the public policy purposes of the statute; but, plaintiffs
would be ensured the opportunity to obtain the attorney of their choice.
2. Extension of controls to all contingency fees
The Roa decision may provide the impetus for legislative enactment
328. The contract provided that the attorneys could, if they wished: "(1) create damaging
publicity to enhance exploitation value, (2) avoid mental defenses because, if successful, they
might suggest petitioner's incapacity to make the contract, and (3) see him convicted and even
sentenced to death for publicity value." Id. at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
Such agreements are generally prohibited by attorney disciplinary rules. See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(A) (1979); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY EC 5-4 (1979) ("Such arrangements should be scrupulously avoided prior to the
termination of all aspects of the matter giving rise to employment); RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL. Rule 5-101 (1980).
329. 30 Cal. 3d at 612, 639 P.2d at 251, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
330. See generally id. at 619, 639 P.2d at 255-56, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 184-85.
331. Id. at 619, 639 P.2d at 255, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
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of contingency fee controls in all types of litigation. Several legislative
proposals have been advanced in California and other states over the past
few years in an attempt to accomplish this goal.332 The Roa court's rea-
soning appears initially to support such an extension because of its con-
clusion that fee limits are generally acceptable and only require a rational
purpose. Further, Chief Justice Bird's dissent suggests that one of the
major problems with section 6146 is the fact that it only applies to medi-
cal malpractice cases. The Chief Justice suggests that if the limits ap-
plied across the board, attorneys would be less able to avoid its
provisions by turning to other fields.3 33 However, the problems inherent
in section 6146 would be exacerbated by an extension of such controls to
all tort litigation.
The primary difficulty with these controls remains the unwarranted
state interference with the litigant's selection of an advocate, a decision
which is protected by the first amendment. Such an intrusion is not justi-
flea by either the state's interest in controlling costs or protecting plain-
tiffs. The lack of evidence that attorney fees contribute in any substantial
measure to escalating insurance costs or that contingency fees are gener-
ally excessive or unreasonable, supports the contrary conclusion that the
imposition of fee limits is an unreasonable exercise of legislative power
which would not survive any more than minimal scrutiny. Further,
although extension of fee restrictions across the board would remove
some of the discriminatory classifications in section 6146, it would not
eliminate the classification based on wealth.
V. CONCLUSION
Crisis management has become a standard practice of both the exec-
utive and legislative branches of government. Because of the enormity
and complexity of most problems facing politicians today, these decision-
makers have been forced to play a reactive rather than proactive role in
addressing societal concerns. Yet, as the history of California's MICRA
statute dramatizes, decision-making in a crisis induced atmosphere
throws the political process out of balance. The California Legislature
reacted to the pressure of a powerful constituent group faced with a seri-
ous concern by imposing burdens on a powerless group of injured vic-
tims. While the judicial branch's role has traditionally been that of a
counterbalance to legislative excesses, the California Supreme Court re-
fused to exercise this considerable power in each of the four MICRA
332. Cal. A.B. 490, 1981-82 Sess. (Feb. 12, 1981); Cal. A.B. 2505, 1985-86 Sess. (March 8,
1985); Cal. S.B. 700, 1985-86 Sess. (March 4, 1985).
333. Roa, 37 Cal. 3d at 943, 695 P.2d at 179, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 92 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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cases. Whether the court's reluctance reveals a new trend or simply an
aberration remains to be seen. But the court's decisions undoubtedly will
give encouragement to other special interests, such as product manufac-
turers, landowners and local governments, in their efforts to seek similar
legislative relief from high jury verdicts and insurance premiums.
334
Two issues of significance remain unresolved by the court's decision
in Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc. The view that attorney fees are a
form of speech protected by the first amendment should emerge as a con-
trolling limitation on legislative regulation. The Roa majority implicitly
conceded that attorney fee regulations affect first amendment rights. The
court failed to conclusively establish that recognition of such rights
would prevent all regulation of attorney fees. The parameters of this
protection and the permissible extent and scope of regulation remain
unclear.
Finally, the Roa majority's failure to discuss the unequal impact of
contingency fee regulations on the poor suggests that the members of the
court were unable to logically address this concern in reaching their re-
sult. Recognition of either issue would have required a higher level of
scrutiny than the court applied in its review of section 6146. However, as
this Note suggests, the full implementation of the statute and a corre-
sponding abandonment of the medical malpractice field by plaintiff's at-
torneys and inability of victims to obtain representation, may force a
reconsideration of the questions raised in this case.
Christine D. Spagnoli
334. Such a "crisis" is apparently developing throughout the liability insurance field. See
Keppel, Liability Insurers Are Fleeing Field in Wake of Big Damage Awards, L.A. Times, June
17, 1985, § IV (Business), at 1, col. 4.
Dec. 1985]

